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Addictive behavior is self-destructive and potentially 
lethal. For that matter, a diagnosis of alcohol abuse or 
dependence requires evidence of some type of alcohol-related 
loss or impairment (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual III, 
1980). Demographic studies show a very high incidence of 
premature death among alcoholics, not only from secondary 
diseases, but also from high rates of suicide, homicide, 
falls, automobile fatalities, and deaths by fire (Combs-Orme 
et al., 1983; Wilhelmsen, Elmfeldt, & Weder, 1983). It is 
estimated that almost 15% of our national health costs are 
for alcoholism and alcohol-related disorders (Holden, 1987). 
Why then do alcoholics, or other substance abusers, persist 
in their a~dictions? Why, for instance, don't the poten-
tially adverse consequences of alcohol abuse more consis-
tently deter further drinking? 
The major aim of this study is to investigate these 
issues by examining the role of cognitions in alcohol abuse 
and dependence. Specifically, beliefs regarding the conse-
quences of alcohol abuse were assessed in an outpatient 
alcoholism treatment population. Such research is apt for 
two principle reasons. First, there is currently little 
information as to the importance of cognitions in the devel-
1 
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opment and maintenance of alcoholism. Secondly, the identi-
fication of specific cognitions associated with alcoholics' 
drinking may prove useful in developing more effective 
strategies for the treatment of alcoholism. 
Regarding the first point, it is not clear how alco-
holics evaluate the risk associated with their behavior. 
Some theorists vie~ alcohol abuse as a slow but systemmatic 
form of suicide (Menninger, 1938). Farbarow (1980) includes 
addictions in the class of "indirect self-destructive beha-
viors,'' in which self-injury is not the primary, conscious 
goal, but rather the by-product of behavior usually organ-
ized around a defense against depression. Behaviorists try 
to identify the specific contingencies that may either rein-
force or punish alcohol abuse (Higgins, 1979). Both social 
learning and cognitive behavioral theories emphasize the 
potentially reinforcing effects of the drinker's expecta-
tions and the often lenient consequences for impaired beha-
vior (Lang et al., 1975; Lang, 1982; Rohsenow, 1983; Rohse-
now & Bachorowski, 1984; Brown, 1985b). 
Some studies suggest that addiction is associated with 
a rather morbid orientation toward the future (Frederick, 
Resnik, & Wittlin, 1973; Gertler, Ferneau, & Raynes, 1973). 
Others show no direct relationship between substance abuse 
and death attitudes or risk-taking behavior (Feifel & Nagy, 
1980; Kumar, Vaidya, & Dwivedi, 1982). Regarding the impor-
tance of cognitions for treatment planning, research has 
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shown that expectations can significantly influence the use 
of alcohol and, at relatively low levels of blood alcohol 
concentration, beliefs regarding consumption can override 
the physiological effects of the alcohol (Wilson, 1981). As 
a case in point, Gossop, Eiser, and Ward (1982) have empha-
sized the need for more information on the role of cognition 
in drug dependence by demonstrating that the ways in which 
addicts perceived their drug-taking are predictive of com-
pliance in treatment. Several investigators have specifi-
cally recommended that treatment be modified to address 
alcoholics' particular perceptions and beliefs about their 
drinking (Stafford, 1982; Cooney et al, 1987; Curry, Mar-
latt, & Gordon, 1987). 
Treatment of alcoholism is frequently complicated by 
the denial processes evidenced by many patients. Denial, 
whether viewed as a defense mechanism or an information 
processing error, involves distorted cognitions. Clini-
cally, it is manifested in a variety of ways: denial of the 
need for treatment; denial of a cause and effect relation-
ship between drinking and marital, occupational, or health 
problems; denial of the magnitude of these problems; and 
denial of the low self-esteem and high levels of anxiety and 
depression characteristic of many alcoholics. Anxiety and 
depression could be considered appropriate responses to a 
realistic appraisal of the risks associated with alcohol 
abuse, assuming that alcoholics perceive their drinking and 
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its consequences in a realistic light. Unfortunately, there 
is little knowledge of alcoholics' expectations of their 
alcohol-related risk or harm. Since alcoholics do not 
represent a homogeneous group (Farbarow, 1980; Kline & Sny-
der, 1985; Holden, 1987), it seems unlikely that denial 
processes could be reduced to a single belief or expecta-
tion. However, distinguishing subgroups of alcoholics, on 
the basis of some of the cognitions that support their 
drinking, could prove helpful in understanding the psychol-
ogy of alcoholism and developing more effective treatment 
programs. A review of the literature shows support for at 
least two fairly divergent cognitions that may underlie 
alcohol abuse. 
One possibility is that some alcoholics believe that 
they personally will not be harmed by continued drinking. 
While they may acknowledge the risks associated with alco-
holism in general, they do not internalize the possible con-
sequences for themselves. Research in the area of beha-
vioral medecine suggests that there is a general tendency 
for people to see themselves as less vulnerable to health 
risks than their peers, and this perceptual bias may be even 
more pronounced among addicted populations. For example, a 
number of studies have shown that smokers, heavy social 
drinkers, drunk drivers, and alcoholics tend not to inter-
nalize the effects of their substance abuse on their own 
bodies (Fishbein, 1977; Schwebal & Kaemmerer, 1977; Selzer & 
Barton, 1977; Rohsenow, 1983; Gabrielli & Plomin, 1985). 
Furthermore, researchers have noted that both smokers and 
social drinkers consistently anticipate significantly more 
positive than negative consequences of their drinking 
(Southwick et al., 1981; Eiser & Harding, 1983; Rohsenow & 
Bachorowski, 1984; Brown, Creamer, & Stetson, 1987). 
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A second distinct possibility is that some alcoholics 
accurately perceive their alcohol-related risks but are 
apathetic about these consequences. Empirical literature 
shows a high incidence of depressive and suicidal ideation 
among alcoholics (Weissman et al., 1977; Murphy et al., 
1979; Bascue & Epstein, 1980; Steer, McElroy, & Beck, 1983). 
There is evidence as well that depressed individuals process 
information about themselves differently from more general 
information: that is, that they perceive themselves and 
their own futures more negatively than do nondepressed indi-
viduals (Coyne & Gotlib, 1983; Alloy & Abramson, 1979; Lew-
insohn, Larsen, & Munoz, 1982; Bradley, 1983; Layne, 1983; 
Segal & Shaw, 1986). Thus a pessimistic or morbid orienta-
tion toward one's own future may characterize the cognitions 
underlying the drinking of more depressed alcoholics. 
The above findings suggest the possibility of a signi-
ficant difference in the types of health expectations held 
by depressed and nondepressed alcoholics. Considering the 
self-destructive quality of their behavior, alcoholics who 
are not depressed need to engage in a more extreme form of 
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cognitive distortion in order to maintain a "normal" posi-
tive bias regarding their own futures. Conversely, more 
depressed alcoholics are likely to be much more realistic in 
their assessment of the risks associated with their contin-
ued drinking. Thus one manifestation of depression in alco-
holies may be in the development of more negative but real-
istic assessments of their future health risks. 
The present study sought support for the hypothesis 
that perceptions of personal susceptibility to health risks 
would vary with the severity of the alcoholic's depression. 
Two samples of male alcoholics in outpatient treatment were 
compared with outpatient male hypertension patients. The 
groups were comparable in terms of socioeconomic status, 
education, and race. It was hypothesized that in all groups 
subjects with little or no depression would show a positive 
bias in their expectancies, and that the less depressed 
alcoholics' bias would be significantly more extreme than 
that of the less depressed medical controls. Conversely, 
more depressed subjects were expected to be negatively 
biased in their expectations for themselves, with the more 
depressed alcoholics' bias again being more extreme than 
that of the more depressed medical controls. These effects 
were expected to hold true for both general expectations of 
personal health risk as well as for risks associated speci-
fically with alcoholism, but not for less personalized views 
of the general risks associated with alcohol abuse. 
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Considering the most extreme consequences of self-destruc-
ti ve behavior, reactions to personal death were also hypo-
thesized to relate to these biases, whereas reactions to the 
deaths of others were not. 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Research clearly documents the health risks associated 
with alcoholism, as well as the high incidence of depressive 
and suicidal ideation among alcoholics. However, studies of 
the perception of health risks among alcohol abusers, smok-
ers, and narcotic addicts yield less clear-cut results. 
While minimizing one's own susceptibility to health risks 
may to some degree be considered normal, addicted persons 
appear to distort their perceived risks to a more extreme 
degree. Studies of perceived personal risk in depressed 
subjects suggest that, conversely, depressed persons do not 
minimize their chances of misfortune: rather, they are apt 
to appraise their futures more realistically and somewhat 
more negatively. Few studies have examined how perceptions 
of personal health risk may relate to the risk-taking beha-
vior and death attitudes of alcoholics, although again eval-
uations of personal death have been shown to be distinct 
from evaluations of more general reminders of death among 
undergraduate subjects. 
I. Health Risks Associated with Alcoholism 
Several large population studies have documented the 
8 
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health risks of alcoholics. Wilhelmsen, Elmfeldt, and Wedel 
(1983) examined the cause of death in over 300 Swedish males 
between the ages of thirty-five and forty-four. A random 
sample of over 900 survivors in the same age range was used 
as a control group for comparison purposes. It was found 
that subjects with a history of alcoholism or being arrested 
for drunkenness had a higher rate of premature death, inclu-
ding significantly higher rates of suicide, heart disease, 
cirrhosis, and accidents. The authors noted, however, that 
smoking and psychosocial problems were potential confounds. 
Combs-Orme, Taylor, Scott, and Holmes (1983) traced 
the mortality of alcoholics six to nine years post-treat-
ment, comparing a sample of almost 1300 alcoholics from four 
sites with local actuarial rates. They found that 22% of 
their sample was dead: of these, 18% had suffered violent 
deaths. This mortality rate was more than three times that 
of the local actuarial rates when adjusted for age, sex, and 
race. The group showed significantly higher rates of fatal 
suicide attempts, burns, falls, and pedestrian and automo-
bile accidents. The authors concluded that the risk was 
associated with both the pharmacological effects of drink-
ing and the alcoholic lifestyle. More recently, Rychtarik 
et al. (1987) reported a 15% mortality rate five to six 
years post-treatment for chronic alcoholic subjects. 
Nuttall, Evenson, and Cho (1980) examined the psychia-
tric histories of 1700 suicides in Missouri between 1972 and 
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1974. They found that 20% had had a previous diagnosis of 
alcoholism. Motto (1980) followed 978 subjects who had been 
diagnosed as suicidal alcohol abusers and reported that 5.5% 
of these subjects had committed suicide within two years. 
Farbarow (1980) estimated the alcoholic suicide attempt rate 
to be 25%, with 10% succeeding, as opposed to the approxi-
mately 1% of deaths by suicide in the general population 
(Combs-Orme et al., 1983). He also cited the American Medi-
cal Association's estimate that the life expectancy of alco-
holics was 12 years less than that of nonalcoholics, due in 
part to high rates of cirrhosis, pancreatitus, and CNS dys-
function. Thus there is substantial evidence of heightened 
health and mortality risks among alcoholics. 
II. Perceptions of Health Risks Among Addicted Persons 
Data suggest that addicted subjects, such as smokers 
and alcoholics, do not accurately perceive their high-risk 
status. Schwebal and Kaemmerer (1977) showed that smoking 
students showed significantly more "alienation from body" 
than did nonsmoker and ex-smoker controls, i.e. a lack of 
internalization of the effects of smoking on their own 
bodies. Eiser and Harding (1983) found that smoking and 
nonsmoking college students in Great Britain differed sig-
nificantly in their perceptions of the perceived benefits 
and risks of smoking cigarettes and marijuana, and the per-
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ceived benefits of drinking alcohol. They also compared 
users and nonusers of seatbelts, finding that nonusers of 
seatbelts were si~nificantly more skeptical of the value of 
preventive behavior. 
In a literature review of smokers' beliefs, Fishbein 
(1977) differentiated three levels of acceptance of risk: 
awareness, generalized acceptance, and personalized accept-
ance. These levels reflect having information of risk, 
accepting its validity, and accepting its significance for 
oneself. Fishbein (1977) found that almost half of the 
smokers studied did not even have full generalized accept-
ance of risk, and concluded that logically even fewer would 
have personalized the risk. Similar results were reported 
in Selzer et al.'s (1977) studies of alcoholics and drunk 
drivers who, compared to controls, assessed their impaired 
driving as significantly safer, even though they also 
admitted to a significantly greater degree of specific 
impaired driving behaviors. 
More recently, Gabrielli and Plomin (1985), comparing 
anticipated sensitivity to alcohol in pairs of twin and 
adopted siblings, found no genetic basis for beliefs about 
alcohol-induced impairment in thinking, mood, or driving 
ability, although a belief of having less sensitivity to 
alcohol was associated with a higher average number of 
drinks per drinking session. However, some studies 
utilizing Zuckerman et al.'s (1964) Sensation Seeking Scale 
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suggest that some drinkers' abuse of alcohol is associated 
with a broader biological responsivity to many forms of 
stimulation (Zuckerman, 1971; Galazio, Rosenthal, & Stein, 
1983). Similarly, Labouvie and McGee's (1986) longitudinal 
data on alcohol and drug use in adolescence suggest that 
heavier use is positively associated with risk-taking 
attributes and negatively associated with cognitive 
complexity and harm avoidance. 
Brown et al. (1980) explored the expectations of rein-
forcement from alcohol in over 400 social drinkers. Their 
responses to a ninety-item questionnaire yielded six inde-
pendent expectancy factors: global positive experiences, 
social/physical pleasure, enhanced sexual performance or 
experience, increased power/aggression, increased social 
assertiveness, and reduced tension. Brown et al. (1980) 
found that expectancies varied with drinking pattern: light 
drinkers tended to have more global positive expectancies, 
whereas heavier drinkers' expectations focused more speci-
fically on enhanced sexual and aggressive behaviors. This 
same questionnaire was used by Brown, Goldman, and Chris-
tianson (1985) to demonstrate a significant positive corre-
lation between the strength of alcohol-effect expectancies 
and the amount of alcohol consumed for alcoholic, medical 
patient, and student samples, a finding replicated by Brown 
and Munson (1987). Brown and Munson (1987) also found sup-
port for the hypothesis that personality factors may differ-
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entially influence motivation for alcohol use. More extro-
verted students were found to expect significantly more 
pleasure, relaxation, and feelings of power from drinking, 
whereas more anxious students anticipated significantly more 
global positive changes, social assertion, sexual enhance-
ment, and feelings of power. Brown (1985b) also reported 
that alcohol expectancies increased the predictability of 
college students' drinking patterns, and that alcohol expec-
tancies differentially related to problemmatic and non-
problemmatic drinking. 
Rohsenow (1983) modified Brown et al.'s (1980) ques-
tionnaire so as to measure additional expectations of nega-
tive consequences and to assess expectations for oneself 
versus others. Rohsenow (1983) found that subjects consis-
tently expected to be less affected by alcohol than others 
would be. Also, medium and heavy drinkers expected to 
experience at least as many positive effects, but no more 
negative effects than would light drinkers. The author sug-
gested that positive expectations influence drinking beha-
vior more than negative expectations, a conclusion shared by 
Southwick et al. (1981), who also found that students who 
were heavy drinkers were more oriented toward the potential 
positive effects of drinking. Similar results were reported 
by Brown, Creamer, and Stetson (1987) in their study of high 
school drinkers. Adolescent alcohol abusers expected signi-
ficantly more positive consequences from alcohol than did a 
nonabusing comparison group, but did not differ in their 
expectations of the negative consequences of deteriorated 
cognitive/motor functioning. 
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Rohsenow and Bachorowski (1984) have also examined the 
effects of alcohol and expectancies on verbal aggression. 
In several studies, students were assigned to beverage 
(alcohol and tonic or tonic alone) and beverage-expectancy 
conditions and were subsequently provoked by an experimen-
ter. Rohsenow and Bachorowski (1984) found that for all 
subjects at higher doses and males at lower doses, those who 
believed that they had received alcohol were significantly 
less aggressive than were subjects expecting only tonic. 
The authors concluded that many of the reinforcements of 
alcohol use were due to the effects of drinkers' cognitions 
rather than the pharmacological effects of the alcohol. 
Several recent studies suggest that the beliefs of the 
drinker or smoker influence response to treatment. Kaufert 
et al. (1986) examined the pre-existing health beliefs of 
volunteer subjects randomly assigned to either hypnosis, 
health education, behavior modification, or a control group 
for smoking cessation. Each treatment group showed a signi-
ficant reduction in cigarette consumption, but the response 
to the health education group in particular could be predic-
ted by initial views of perceived vulnerability and general 
health concern, suggesting that pre-existing health beliefs 
might influence responsiveness to a particular modality of 
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treatment (Kaufert et al., 1986). Along these same lines, 
Eiser et al. (1985) evaluated data from over 2300 respon-
dents to a television promotion to quit smoking, and found 
that expectancy of success and perceived health benefit were 
highly predictive of attempts to quit and success at one 
year follow-up. 
Cooney et al. (1987) assessed cognitive and affective 
changes in abstinent alcoholic and nonalcoholic drinkers 
after exposure to an alcohol cue. The authors found that 
all subjects, after an alcohol cue exposure, experienced an 
increased desire to drink, and anticipation of positive 
effects and little impairment from drinking. However, other 
reactions associated only with alcoholic subjects included 
increased physical symptoms and feelings of guilt, more 
external attributions for the cause of the desire to drink, 
and decreased confidence about maintaining abstinence. 
These cognitive and affective changes were interpreted as 
consistent with Marlatt's (1978) ''abstinence violation 
effect," evidenced among smokers too, in which the awareness 
of desire for a substance leads to feeling of guilt and 
lessened self-efficacy, even if abstinence is maintained. 
Cooney et al. (1987) emphasized the importance of identify-
ing and modifying these responses for relapse prevention. 
Additional support for the abstinence violation effect 
("AVE") as a cognitive-behavioral model of the relapse proc-
ess was recently reported by Curry, Marlatt, and Gordon 
(1987). When AVE's were operationalized as internal, sta-
ble, and global attributions for a lapse in smoking cessa-
tion, they were the strongest predictor of relapse within 
one year post-treatment. Curry, Marlatt, and Gordon (1987) 
recommended the use of such cognitive-behavioral interven-
tions as cognitive restructuring and role playing to rein-
force attributional styles more supportive of regaining 
abstinence after a lapse. 
III. Self-Other Differences in Perceptions of Risk 
16 
It appears that most people evaluate their own attri-
butes and behavior differently from the way in which they 
evaluate others. Some studies with college students suggest 
that even on an information processing level there are dif-
ferences in the way we perceive ourselves and others. Kui-
per and Rogers (1979) looked at how students encoded data 
about themselves and others, and found that different pro-
cesses were used. Subjects utilized a more efficient, 
organized schema for self-relevant information, whereas 
information about others required memory rehearsal and an 
apparent comparison and contrast with oneself. In examining 
differences in attribution processes, Weary (1980) found 
that students were more likely to make self-attributions for 
successful outcomes, especially under high-publicity condi-
tions. 
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Hull, Young, and Jouriles (1986) have related patterns 
of encoding self-relevant information to differences in 
alcohol use and abuse. In a set of studies with alcoholic 
veterans and drinking adolescents, the authors reported 
results highly consistent with the self-awareness model of 
alcohol consumption: namely, that highly self-conscious 
individuals drink to control sensitivity to positive and 
negative self-relevant experiences. In the first study, 
highly self-conscious alcoholics experiencing negative self-
relevant events were significantly more likely to relapse 
within three months post-treatment, whereas the drinking of 
low self-conscious alcoholics was unrelated to the quality 
of their experiences (accounting for 30% and 1% of the vari-
ance in alcoholic relapse, respectively). In a second 
study, Hull, Young, and Jouriles (1986) demonstrated that 
high school students' drinking was influenced by different 
psychological and social factors, depending upon the degree 
of their self-consciousness. 
This self-other difference in evaluation has also been 
demonstrated in views of mortality and health risk. Tolor 
and Murphy (1967) reported that men significantly overesti-
mated their own projected life span by an average of ten 
years more than their estimates of life expectancy for other 
men. Neither anxiety nor experiences with death were signi-
ficantly correlated with this tendency to overestimate one's 
own life expectancy. Handel (1969), also investigating sub-
jective life expectancy, concluded as well that men were 
more defensive about their own deaths. Perceived personal 
invulnerability has also been demonstrated in relation to 
risk of cancer, heart attack, pneumonia, alcoholism, vene-
. real disease, and divorce (Perloff & Fetzer, 1986). 
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Weinstein (1980, 1982, 1984) conducted a series of 
studies of college students' perceptions of personal suscep-
tibility to health and safety risks. In his first study, 
Weinstein (1980) had students rate the probability of exper-
iencing various future life events relative to the probabil-
ity for their peers. The group means reflected a signifi-
cantly optimistic bias regarding one's own future: students 
anticipated significantly more positive and fewer negative 
events in their own futures than in their peers' futures. 
Having the subjects list their reasons for their judgments 
decreased but did not eliminate the bias for anticipated 
positive events. Incidentally, the anticipation of future 
alcohol problems had the strongest positive bias of all. 
Weinstein (1980) suggested that the results could be inter-
preted in either a motivational/defensive or cognitive 
error/information processing framework, i.e. either as an 
unconscious defense against depression or as an unrealistic 
conclusion based on an illogical synthesis of information. 
Weinstein (1982) then focused on expectations of 
health and life-threatening behavior, and found that stu-
dents showed a significant optimistic bias for their own 
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future health on thirty-four out of forty-five potential 
diseases or symptoms. This bias correlated significantly 
with perceived controllability, lack of previous experience 
with the illness, and belief that risk ended with childhood. 
Interest in preventive behavior was shown to correlate posi-
tively with the perceived likelihood of risk, the severity 
of the risk, and the degree of worry associated with the 
specific risk-- correlates similar to those reported in 
Eiser and Harding's (1983) study of smokers and seatbelt 
users. An optimistic bias regarding risk, then, might 
interfere with preventive behavior by lessening worry about 
potential health risks (Weinstein, 1982). 
In a more recent study, Weinstein (1984) examined the 
basis of biased expectancies, and found that students were 
unrealistically optimistic regarding their ability to lessen 
their susceptibility by their own behavioral and psychologi-
cal attributes. Students evaluated risks associated with 
heredity factors fairly realistically, and were somewhat 
pessimistic regarding environmental factors. 
holism rated among the lowest perceived risks. 
Again, alco-
All correla-
tions between behavior and perceptions of susceptibility 
were weak except for smoking, which may reflect the impact 
of recent efforts to educate the public regarding the haz-
ards of smoking. Weinstein (1984) found that factors per-
ceived to increase risk carried more weight in judging per-
sonal risk than did the risk-decreasing factors, although 
fewer were cited as the bases for judgments, i.e. subjects 
were generally more oriented toward factors that decreased 
their risk of disease. The author suggested self-esteem 
enhancement as a motive. 
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Adapting Weinstein's methods, Perloff and Fetzer 
(1986) had undergraduates evaluate their own risks and those 
of either an average person, average student, close friend, 
sibling, or parent, and found significant differences in 
self-other comparisons under the two "average" conditions 
but not with specific others as the comparison targets. In 
a second study, some students were assigned a comparison 
target of either an average student or a close friend, while 
a third group was free to select any friend for similar 
self-other risk ratings. Perloff and Fetzer (1986) found 
significantly larger self-other differences for the "aver-
age" and "any friend" conditions, with the majority of the 
subjects in the latter condition selecting people they per-
ceived as particularly at risk. Again, perception of future 
drinking problems showed one of the strongest self-other 
effects. The authors offered an ego-defensive downward-
comparisons interpretation, suggesting that when given the 
opportunity, people will lessen their anxiety about the 
possibility of negative experiences by focusing on others 
perceived to be more at risk. 
Thus, while the health risks associated with alcohol-
ism are clearly documented, there are indications that many 
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drinkers unrealistically minimize their personal risk of 
harm. Some studies of information processing suggest that 
most people evaluate information about themselves differ-
ently from information about others (Kuiper & Rogers, 1979; 
Weary, 1980; Perloff & Fetzer, 1986). Weinstein's (1980, 
1982, 1984) studies support these findings by demonstrating 
that college students consistently underestimate their per-
sonal susceptibility to health risks. Studies with drinkers 
and smokers show a similar lack of acceptance of personal 
risk (Fishbein, 1977; Schwebal -& Kaemmerer, 1977; Selzer et 
al., 1977). Several researchers have found heavy drinkers 
to perceive others (as opposed to themselves) as more 
affected by alcohol and more vulnerable to the negative 
consequences of drinking (Brown et al., 1980; Southwick et 
al., 1981; Rohsenow, 1983; Brown & Munson, 1987). These 
findings suggest that some alcoholics do not internalize the 
health risks associated with continued drinking, and this 
unrealistic appraisal of personal risk may interfere with 
the development of more preventive and adaptive behavior. 
IV. Rates of Depression and Suicide Among Alcoholics 
There is a high incidence of depressive and suicidal 
ideation among alcoholics. Nakamura et al. (1983) reported 
25% of inpatient alcoholic veterans had moderate to marked 
depression at intake, and this initial level of depression 
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correlated with overall severity of abuse and a history of 
addiction, sleep disturbance, and neurological or organic 
symptoms. Levels of depression generally decreased across 
the time of treatment. Behar, Winokur, & Berg (1984) looked 
at levels of depression in abstinent alcoholics and found 
that 16% reported debilitating depressive symptoms beginning 
after a mean of 35 months of sobriety. The depressed sub-
jects had a longer mean period of abstinance, and 46% had 
experienced a social stress prior to onset of the depres-
sion. Holden (1987) also reported that depression, as a 
primary diagnosis among alcoholics, is associated with more 
benefit from treatment. 
Weissman et al. (1977) found that 59% of outpatient 
alcoholics sampled were diagnosed as having a secondary 
depression, i.e. depression that followed or developed as a 
complication of another diagnosed mental illness. The 
authors noted that the demographic backgrounds of alcoholics 
with secondary depression differed little from the back-
grounds of the nondepressed alcoholics, thus making the non-
depressed alcoholics appropriate controls for studying the 
unique effects of depression in this population. They also 
cited literature estimating the prevalence rates of secon-
dary depression in alcoholism to range from 28% to 59%--
more than double the 13% to 20% incidence rates of depres-
sion in the general population (Oliver & Simmons, 1984; Oli-
ver & Simmons, 1985). 
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Woodruff et al. (1973b) also reported that alcohol 
abuse preceded depression in over 90% of their sample of 
depressed alcoholics. Depressed alcoholics were found to be 
more like nondepressed alcoholics than like primary depres-
sives on a number of personality and socio-economic vari-
ables. A significant sex difference was also observed: 
there was a higher incidence of depression among female 
alcoholics than male alcoholics. However, Gibson and Becker 
(1973a) found the cognitive organization of depression in 
alcoholics to be highly similar to that of primary depres-
sives. Examining the factor structure of responses on the 
Beck Depression Inventory, the authors noted that alcoholics 
tend to have high depression scores that load on three fac-
tors comparable to the factors identified in a study of pri-
mary depressive subjects by Beck (1967). The authors sug-
gested that this cognitive similarity reflects either a con-
commitant primary depression among many alcoholics or else 
"transdiagnostic" factors that are not unique to depression. 
A number of researchers have examined suicidal idea-
tion and attempts among alcoholics. Bascue and Bpstein 
(1980) found that 67% of veterans in an inpatient alcoholism 
treatment unit reported having seriously considered suicide, 
and 25% reported having made suicide attempts in the past. 
Beck, Steer, and McElroy (1982) studied the relationship 
between hopelessness and suicidal ideation in alcoholic out-
patients. They found a mean Beck Depression Inventory score 
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of 13.88 for the sample, indicating mild depression, and 
found that hopelessness (as measured by Beck's Hopelessness 
Scale) accounted for 42% of the variance of current suicidal 
ideation. Using the s~me sample, Steer, Beck, and McElroy 
(1983) reported moderate to severe depression in 33.3% of 
the subjects, with 27% reporting prior suicide attempts. 
Level of depression was significantly correlated with a his-
tory of suicide attempts, severity of recent drinking, and 
being white. Beck, Weissman and Kovacs (1976) found hope-
lessness accounted for 16% of the variance of suicidal 
intent in a sample of 378 suicide attempters, some of whom 
were heavy drinkers. 
Two other studies also utilized retrospective data to 
help predict suicide among alcoholics. Murphy et al. (1979) 
replicated an earlier finding that roughly one third of sui-
cides in an alcoholic sample were associated with a signi-
ficant interpersonal loss within six weeks of the suicide. 
They also reported that more than two thirds of the suicidal 
subjects had had a definite or likely secondary depression, 
but it was suicide and not depression that was related to 
the experience of a recent significant loss. And Berglund 
(1984) followed over 1300 alcoholic subjects admitted to a 
psychiatric unit across thirty-one years, and found 41% were 
dead, with 14% of these deaths officially registered as sui-
cide and 7% more cases of uncertain suicide. Alcoholics who 
had later committed suicide had higher rates of dysphoria, 
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depressive symptoms, and peptic ulcers at admission, 
although frequencies of cognitive impairment and delirium 
tremens were similar to those of survivors. Suicide risk 
was 7% for the total sample, rising to 9% if depression or 
dysphoria was present, and 18% if subjects had a history of 
peptic ulcer. Thus the alcoholic population is distinctly 
more at risk for the problems of depression and suicide. 
V. The Role of Cognitions in Depression 
In recent years there has been extensive inquiry into 
the significance of the cognitive patterns associated with 
depression. While some findings have proved equivocal, in 
all there has been support for a number of the assertions of 
cognitive models of depression, including: depressed sub-
jects have less positive perceptions of and expectations for 
themselves than do nondepressed subjects, and they show some 
distinctive attributional styles that have implications for 
reinforcing negative self-schema and weakening motivation to 
cope with environmental stressors (Segal & Shaw, 1986; 
Sweeney, Anderson, & Bailey, 1986). 
In a meta-analysis of 104 studies of attributional 
styles in depression, Sweeney, Anderson, and Bailey (1986) 
found several consistent patterns, independent of such 
potential confounds as subject population or the measures 
used. Particularly in relation to experiences of negative 
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events, depressed subjects showed strong tendencies toward 
attributions of internal, stable, and to a lesser degree 
global causes-- failures were perceived as a function of a 
lack of ability. Conversely, positive events were associ-
ated with depressive attributions of external, unstable, and 
specific causes, such as luck. These findings were highly 
consistent with the leading cognitive theories of depres-
sion, i.e. Beck's cognitive theory and the reformulated 
learned helplessness theory of depression. 
Coyne and Gotlib's (1983) examination of the support 
for these two cognitive theories was more critical, with an 
overall conclusion that there was no strong empirical base 
for one of the most important tenets, the causal role of 
cognitions in depression. Even so, the authors did find 
support for the theory-based predictions that depressed 
subjects present themselves more negatively, make more 
internal attributions for negative experiences, are more 
negative in recall of feedback, and are more negative but 
possibly more realistic in self-evaluations. In a recent 
critique of Coyne and Gotlib's (1983) conclusions, Segal and 
Shaw (1986) reiterated the significance of depressogenic 
cognitions as part of the complex interaction of biochemical 
and behavioral symptoms of depression, and the potential 
value of identifying cognitive vulnerability markers that 
contribute to the onset of depression. 
Other literature reviews have also found support for 
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the hypothesis that depressed subjects are more realistic 
and less defensively biased in their appraisal of themselves 
and their futures. Layne (1983) concluded that depressed 
subjects have more realistic expectancies, perceptions, 
self-monitoring, memory, and attributions across a variety 
of tasks and outcomes. The author noted that nondepressed 
persons may be less realistic but better adapted in terms of 
maintaining motivation and the effects of self-fulfilling 
prophecies. Krantz's (1985) review suggested that the nega-
tive views characteristic of depression are in large part a 
rational response to such realities as more negative life 
experiences, social and interpersonal deficits, and more 
negative appraisals by others. Krantz (1985) hypothesized 
that at different stages of depression, the self-schema may 
interact differently with the types of information available 
from the environment. 
Similarly, Alloy and Abramson (1979) found more dis-
tortion in nondepressed students' judgments of contingency. 
In several experiments, depressed students were more nega-
tive yet more accurate in estimating the contingency between 
their responses and subsequent positive or negative out-
comes. Nondepressed subjects were significantly more apt to 
have an illusion of control, particularly associated with 
positive outcomes. In Lewinsohn et al.'s (1981) longitu-
dinal study of depressive cognitions, community volunteers 
were assessed across an average interval of eight months for 
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patterns of expectancies and beliefs. The authors found 
that cognitions at the first measurement differenti~ted the 
depressed subjects from controls but did not predict subse-
quent depressive episodes. Support was found for a positive 
correlation between depression and negative expectations, 
and a negative correlation between depression and positive 
expectations. Lewinsohn et al. (1981) concluded that the 
cognitions were concommitant to the experience of depres-
sion, but were not causal or stable patterns of negative 
thinking. 
Some studies support viewing the cognitive style of 
depressives as distorted or irrational. Eaves and Rush 
(1984) examined cognitive patterns in depressed subjects and 
found that they showed significantly more dysfunctional 
attitudes than did matched controls, both when symptommatic 
and in remission. Depressed subjects also demonstrated sig-
nificantly more negative automatic thoughts and a different 
attributional style vis a vis negative events, which led the 
authors to conclude that negative views were characteristic 
of depression, as predicted by cognitive theories of depres-
sion. Eaves and Rush (1984) emphasized the need to find evi-
dence for the causal role of cognitions in depression, as 
well as their role in other forms of psychopathology. 
Kuiper and McCabe (1985) found that subjects who were 
depressed or cognitively vulnerable to depression evaluated 
negative topics as more appropriate for discussion than did 
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nondepressed subjects. The authors suggested that this dif-
ference in social judgment might stimulat~ rejection and 
reinforce the social isolation experjenced by many depressed 
people. Also, Cook and Peterson (1986) found depressed stu-
dents to endorse more self-deprecating beliefs and to offer 
fewer logical and more illogical justifications for their 
causal attributions. 
There is also some evidence that depressed individuals 
process information about themselves in a unique manner. 
Bradley (1983) found support for a negative self-schema 
model of depression by demonstrating that depressed subjects 
recalled significantly more negative words in a self-refer-
ent condition only. Whereas nondepressed controls showed a 
positive bias in self-referent words, depressed subjects 
showed a positive bias only in an other-referent condition, 
therefore not displaying a generalized negative bias. In 
other words, depressed subjects were less positive only in 
relation to themselves. Ingram (1984) reported that nega-
tive mood states led to a deeper processing of personally 
relevant negative feedback. 
Crocker, Kayne, and Alloy (1985) reported that 
depressed and nondepressed students differed in self-other 
comparisons particularly in terms of depression-relevant 
items. Nondepressed subjects seldom rated depressive items 
as self-relevant, and when they did they were more apt to 
"normalize" the items by rating them as true of others as 
well. In contrast, depressed subjects did not show this 
self-enhancement effect, instead endorsing more depressive 
items as self-relevant, independent of ratings of others. 
The results of these studies are all in accord with Kuiper 
and Ross's (1979) assertion that people use different pro-
cesses for encoding information about themselves than they 
use for encoding information about others. 
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Consistent with these findings, Lewinsohn et al. 
(1982) found partial support for Beck's cognitive triad of 
depression, i.e. that negative views of the self, the world, 
and the future lead to distortions of experience and subse-
quent symptoms of depression. The authors reported that 
self-referent items best discriminated between depressed 
subjects and nondepressed controls. Depressed subjects dem-
onstrated significantly more negative and fewer positive 
expectations for themselves and their own futures, but not 
for the present and future of the world at large. Munoz and 
Lewinsohn (unpublished manuscript) essentially replicated 
these results with another sample of community volunteers. 
Depressed subjects showed greater agreement with irrational 
beliefs and greater negative expectancies for themselves, as 
well as more frequent negative thoughts, less frequent posi-
tive thoughts, less emotional response to positive thoughts, 
and more negative emotional reaction to self-related nega-
tive thoughts. Self-related scales most differentiated 
depressed subjects, and the authors concluded that a nega-
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tive view of oneself is unique to depression. However, Mar-
tin, Ward, and Clark (1983) found that neuroticism, not 
depression, was associated with selective attention to self-
referent negative information in female undergraduates. And 
Gibson and Becker's (1973a) report of the cognitive similar-
ity between depressed alcoholics and primary depressives 
does not support Munoz and Lewinsohn's (submitted for publi-
cation) suggestion that negative self-perceptions are unique 
to depression. 
A more recent set of studies by Pyszczynski, Holt and 
Greenberg (1987) found strong support for Kuiper's negative 
self-schema theory of depression. After demonstrating that 
depressed undergraduate subjects were significantly less 
optimistic about their own futures, the authors manipulated 
the degree of internal or external focus among subjects, 
hypothesizing that a more internal focus (and accompanying 
activation of self-schema) would intensify the degree of 
bias among the depressed and nondepressed students. Con-
sistent with this hypothesis, Pyszczynski, Holt, and Green-
berg (1987) found externally focused depressed subjects to 
be no more pessimistic than nondepressed subjects, whereas 
internally focused depressed subjects maintained a distinct 
pessimistic bias. The authors concluded that an internal 
focus stimulated use of self-schema as the reference for 
evaluating oneself and others by comparison. 
In summary, estimates of the prevalence of depression 
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in alcoholics typically range from approximately 25% to 60%, 
depending upon the method of assessment, with reported sui-
cide attempts in 7% to 27% of the alcoholics sampled (Weiss-
man et al., 1977; Steer, Beck, & McElroy, 1983; Hesselbrock 
et al., 1983; Berglund, 1984). While support is equivocal 
concerning the hypothesized causal role of cognitions in 
depression, there is evidence that depressed subjects are 
characteristically less positive in their perceptions and 
evaluations of themselves, as opposed to more global nega-
tive views (Segal & Shaw, 1986; Sweeney, Anderson, & Bailey, 
1986; Eaves & Rush, 1984; Pyszczynski, Holt, & Greenberg, 
1987). Several researchers have concluded that depressed 
individuals, while more negative, are more realistic in 
their appraisals of themselves and their futures (Alloy & 
Abramson, 1979; Layne, 1983; Krantz, 1985). These studies 
suggest that depressed alcoholics are apt to be more nega-
tive, but more realistic, in their perceptions of their 
future health risks. 
V. Death Attitudes and Life-Threatening Behavior 
There are only a few studies of death attitudes in 
addicted populations. In research with alcoholic subjects, 
no clear relationship has been found between the self-des-
tructive behavior associated with alcoholism and the sub-
jects' death attitudes. Feifel and Nagy (1980) examined the 
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relationship of death attitudes to both life-threatening and 
risk-taking behavior in a sample of more than 600 male sub-
jects. Alcoholics, addicts, and prisoners were compared to 
control groups of government employees and deputies for 
death attitudes on several levels of consciousness. Feifel 
and Nagy (1980) found few significant differences in death 
attitudes when they controlled for socioeconomic status, 
verbal I.Q., and age. All groups showed more fear of death 
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on fantasy and unconscious levels; all groups were more /"41.1~ 
positive regarding life than death. The control group di{~ 
report significantly fewer suicidal thoughts or attempts.: r;,;, 
Kumar, Vaidya, and Dwivedi (1982) found differences 
between subtypes of alcoholics and their death anxiety, 
measured by the Templer-McMordie scale. Using Brown's 
(1977) system for differentiating gamma (loss of control) 
and delta (inability to abstain) alcoholic subgroups, plus a 
control group of nondrinkers, the authors found that delta 
alcoholics reported significantly more death anxiety than 
controls, who in turn had significantly more death anxiety 
than gamma alcoholics. Kumar, Vaidya, and Dwivedi (1982) 
concluded that there was a need to study multidimensional 
personality and drinking patterns in alcoholics. 
Other studies with smokers and heroin addicts suggest 
evidence of some morbidity in attitudes. Schwebal and Kaem-
merer (1977) noted that most smokers tend to be fatalistic 






thus they are disinclined to try to increase their life 
expectancy by not smoking. Templer (1972) reported that 
fear of death correlated with the amount of smoking among 
smoking subjects, although there were no significant differ-
ences between smokers, quitters, and nonsmokers. However, 
his findings were not replicated by either Berman (1973) or 
McDonald (1976). Frederick, Resnick, and Wittlin (1973), 
comparing levels of morbidity and depression in heroin 
addicts with abstinent and methadone maintenance controls, 
found that addicts reported significantly more depression 
and expectations of violent death. Gertler, Ferneau, and 
Raynes (1973) found that addicts reported significantly more 
wishes for death than did control groups of hospital staff 
and psychiatric patients. The addicts and the psychiatric 
patients also admitted to significantly more preoccupation 
with thoughts of death. Parker (1981), examining the mean-
ings associated with suicide in young suicidal drug abusers, 
found that subjects judged as low-intent attempters per-
ceived an overdose as a means of escaping tension rather 
than as a suicide attempt per se. However, the high-intent 
suicide attempters tended to perceive their overdoses more 
as attempts to die and to communicate personal needs. 
Generally, there is no clear association between fear 
of death and most risk-taking behavior, as studied with sam-
ples of deputies, policemen, skydivers, and students (Les-
ter, 1967; Ford, Alexander, & Lester, 1971; Alexander & Les-
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ter, 1972; Mc Donald, 1976; Feifel & Nagy, 1980). However, 
there is some support for a relationship between fear of 
death and suicide as a particular risk-taking behavior. 
Lester (1967) found that college students who admitted to a 
history of suicidal threats or attempts had significantly 
less fear of death and admitted to seeing the manipulative 
advantages of suicide. Adams, Giffen, and Garfield (1973) 
also found support for a risk-taking personality factor as a 
correlate of suicide attempts. In their study, suicide 
attempters and matched psychiatric controls were given a 
gambling task. Seventy-one percent of the suicidal subjects 
had been rated as "gambling" with their suicide attempt, 
i.e. showing mixed feelings or intent, and this group took 
significantly more risks than the controls. However, Tar-
ter, Templer, and Perley (1974) found no significant corre-
lation between death anxiety and risk or lethality of sui-
cide attempt. Their sample of hospitalized suicide attemp-
ters showed a small but significant correlation between 
death anxiety and rescue potential, but difficulties with 
the validity and reliability of their measure, the Templer 
Death Anxiety Scale (McMordie, 1979; Durlak, 1982), make 
these results difficult to interpret. 
VII. Other Correlates and Measures of Death Attitudes 
While no firm relationship between death attitudes and 
36 
risk-taking behaviors has been established, there is evi-
dence for a number of correlates of death anxiety or fear. 
Pollack's (1979) review of the literature up to 1977 found 
that women consistently express at least as much and usually 
more death anxiety than men. Both Berman and Hays (1973) 
and Sadowski, Davis, and Loftus-Vergari (1979) also reported 
finding significantly greater death anxiety in female sub-
jects. Berman and Hays (1973) also found a weak correlation 
between death anxiety and a belief in afterlife, and no sig-
nificant relationship between death anxiety and the Rotter 
Locus of Control Scale. However, Sadowski, Davis, and Lof-
tus-Vergari (1979) found some sex differences on the Reid-
Ware Three Factor Locus of Control, with both sexes' death 
anxiety loading primarily on a self-control factor, but 
women's death anxiety loading secondarily on a social system 
control factor, whereas men's secondary factor was that of 
fatalism. 
Pollack (1979) also reported that death anxiety shows 
no direct correlation with age but is positively correlated 
with an orientation toward the past, and shows no clear 
relationship with physical deterioration or denial. Fear of 
death is a correlate of but is not equivalent to measures of 
general anxiety or neuroticism, and shows little correlation 
with dependency, guilt, or hostility (Pollack, 1979; Little-
field & Fleming, 1984). It is positively correlated with 
sensitization, and negatively correlated with a sense of 
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self-efficacy, purpose, or meaning in life (Pollack, 1979). 
Death anxiety has also been demonstrated to have some corre-
lation with MMPI depression scores in both middle aged and 
elderly subjects, but not with younger subjects (Templer, 
1971). 
Similarly, Lucas (1974) found some relationships 
between death anxiety and MMPI depression scores for dialy-
sis patients and their wives. Death anxiety correlated with 
neither seriousness of illness nor with most MMPI scales. 
It was negatively correlated with the K scale and positively 
correlated with scales 2 and 10 on the MMPI; it also corre-
lated with other measures of anxiety, but less than their 
intercorrelations, thus demonstrating some discriminant val-
idity. More recently Wagner and Lorion (1984) looked at 
death anxiety and depression in several geriatric samples in 
both the community and in institutions. Their results indi-
cated little consistency in predictors of death anxiety, and 
the authors concluded that death anxiety is a function of 
the population examined, rather than a general characteris-
tic per se of the elderly. Thus, based on empirical find-
ings to date, any relationship between depression and death 
anxiety is weak at best. However, a clearer relationship 
might be identified in relation to more specific death 
attitudes. 
Several researchers have in fact reported the need to 
differentiate among different types of death attitudes, 
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including differentiating attitudes toward personal death 
from those regarding others' deaths. Florian and Har-Evan 
(1983) found sex differences in Jewish high school students' 
perceptions of personal death. Self-reported death atti-
tudes yielded six factors of personal death. Female stu-
dents' fear of death was associated with loss of identity 
and self-annihilation, whereas male subjects' fear of death 
was associated with consequences for the family and punish-
ment in the hereafter. The authors suggested that the mean-
ings given to the fear of personal death reflected cultural 
influences and merited further investigation. Using a 
broader age range in his sample, Devins (1979) examined 
death attitudes relative to proximity of death and experien-
ces with death. He found death anxiety to be negatively 
correlated with age and not significantly related to health 
status. He found that the factor "fear of personal death'' 
accounted for 20% of the variance in Templer's Death Anxiety 
Scale scores, and suggested that heightened death anxiety 
was associated with experiences of others' deaths that most 
closely approximated one's expectations of one's own future 
death. Hoelter (1979) and Durlak (1982) also found Tem-
pler's Death Anxiety Scale to be multidimensional, noting 
that the total score masked significant sources of variance 
among its subscales. 
Durlak and Kass (1981) factor analyzed fifteen of the 
most widely used self-report death scales, which yielded 
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five orthogonal death attitude factors: negative evaluation 
of death, reluctance to interact with the dying, negative 
reaction to pain, reaction to reminders of death, and pre-
occupation with thoughts of death. The authors concluded 
that the data supported the thanatological theory that death 
attitudes are multidimensional and as such must be differ-
entiated in assessment. Durlak and Kass (1981) also sug-
gested "death attitudes" may be a more accurate descriptor 
than simply "death fear" or "death anxiety," as reactions to 
death appear to include worry, threat, depression, and non-
acceptance as well as fear or anxiety. Rigdon and Epting 
(1982) reported an alternate analysis of the data from Dur-
lak and Kass's (1981) study, theorizing a single factor 
involving an individual's general response to personal 
death. In reply, Kass and Durlak (1982) justified their 
choice of analyses and cited evidence supporting the multi-
dimensionality of death attitudes. 
Additional support was found for two of these fac-
tors-- negative evaluation of personal death and reactions 
to reminders of death-- in a subsequent multitrait-multi-
method study by Durlak and Kasimatis (in press). Structured 
interviews were used to assess the validity of responses on 
seven self-report death scales, yielding moderate convergent 
and discriminant validity for Dickstein's (1974) Negative 
Evaluation of Death Scale, Nelson and Nelson's (1974) Death 
Avoidance Scale, and Collett and Lester's (1969) Fear of 
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Death of Others Scale. The first scale measures negative 
feelings about one's own death; the latter two relate to 
reactions to reminders of death, such as a corpse or a 
funeral. The validity of these measures was supported in a 
study by Kasimatis and Durlak (unpublished manuscript), in 
which the two death attitude factors were differentially 
related to three different dimensions of religious orienta-
tion. 
In summary, then, there are few clear relationships 
between death attitudes and addiction or other risk-taking 
behaviors. Feifel and Nagy (1980) found few significant 
differences in the death attitudes of alcoholics and con-
trols, yet Kumar, Vaidya, and Dwivedi (1982) found that 
chronic alcoholics admitted to significantly more fear of 
death than did binge alcoholics. There is evidence that 
smokers and heroin addicts have a morbid orientation toward 
their own deaths (Gertler, Ferneau, & Raynes, 1973; Fred-
erick, Resnick & Wittlin, 1973; Schwebal & Kaemmerer, 1979). 
Death anxiety is significantly related to suicide as a risk-
taking behavior, but shows a weak correlation with depres-
sion (Lester, 1967; Adams, Giffen, & Garfield, 1973; Pol-
lack, 1979). Measures of death anxiety correlate with meas-
ures of general anxiety but demonstrate discriminant val-
idity (Lucas, 1974; Pollack, 1979; Littlefield & Fleming, 
1984). There is growing evidence that death attitudes are 
multidimensional and that attitudes toward personal death 
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are distinct from more general attitudes toward death (Dev-
ins, 1977; Durlak & Kass, 1981; Durlak, 1982; Durlak & Kas-
imatis, in press). These findings suggest that the rela-
tionship between alcoholics' death attitudes and their beha-
vior may not be clear unless attitudes toward personal death 
are differentiated from more general attitudes toward death. 
Also, the findings with smokers and heroin addicts suggest 
that alcoholics' attitudes toward their own deaths (as 
opposed to more general death attitudes) are more likely to 
covary with depression. 
VIII. Summary of Literature and Hypotheses 
The present study investigated the effects of depres-
sion on expectations of personal risk or harm among male 
alcoholics. Specifically, this study attempted to demon-
strate that alcoholics with varying degrees of depression 
have widely discrepent perceptions of and attitudes toward 
the destructive consequences of their drinking. It was 
expected that non- or low-depression alcoholics would mini-
mize their personal vulnerability to the clearly adverse 
sequelae of chronic alcoholism, whereas more depressed 
alcoholics would more realistically assess their risks and 
be much more negative in their perceptual biases. 
In a review of the literature on the objective assess-
ments of the risks associated with alcoholism, the research 
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findings consistently demonstrated the shortened life expec-
tancy of the chronic alcoholic, whether due to illness, 
accident, suicide, or homicide (Farbarow, 1980; Combs-Orme 
et al., 1983; Wilhelmsen, Elmfeldt, & Wedel, 1983; Rychtarik 
et al., 1987). However, research on the subjective assess-
ments of personal risk among addicted subjects, including 
alcoholics, suggests that alcohol abuse or dependence is 
associated with more subjective and unrealisticlly positive 
expectations of reinforcement from alcohol (Schwebal & 
Kaemmerer, 1977; Selzer et al., 1977; Brown et al., 1980; 
Southwick et al., 1981; Rohsenow, 1983; Brown, Creamer, & 
Stetson, 1987). 
The fact that this bias is self-referent and not gen-
eralized is consistent with studies demonstrating that most 
people encode information about themselves differently than 
they encode information about others (Kuiper & Rogers, 1979; 
Weary, 1980). In fact, to a degree it may be not only nor-
mal but also adaptive to be optimistic in one's expectations 
for one's future (Weinstein, 1982; Layne, 1983; Weinstein, 
1984; Segal & Shaw, 1986). However, to the extent that an 
unrealistically positive bias lessens anxiety, it can lessen 
interest in preventive behavior and support risk-taking 
behavior (Weinstein, 1982; Perloff & Fetzer, 1986). Given 
the obvious risks associated with alcohol abuse, one could 
plausibly speculate that alcoholic subjects' denial reflects 
a more extreme form of positive bias (Selzer et al., 1977). 
Based on these research findings, the following were hypo-
thesized: 
43 
Hypothesis 1. Low-depression subjects will show a pos-
itive bias in personal expectations regarding the con-
sequences of their drinking. 
Hypothesis 2. This positive bias will be circumscribed 
to expectancies for personal wellbeing, and not more 
global expectations for others. 
Hypothesis 3. Given the risks inherent in their drink-
ing behavior, low-depression alcoholics will show a 
stronger positive bias than will low-depression medi-
cal patients. 
High rates of depression and suicidal ideation or 
attempts have been noted among alcoholics (Weissman et al., 
1977; Bascue & Epstein, 1980; Steer, McElroy, & Berg, 1983; 
Behar, Winokur, & Berg, 1984; Berglund, 1984). Furthermore, 
depressed individuals have demonstrated more negative but 
more realistic appraisals of themselves and their futures 
(Alloy & Abramson, 1979; Coyne & Gotlib, 1983; Layne, 1983; 
Munoz & Lewinsohn, unpublished manuscript). Again, this 
bias is self-referent, not global, but it is skewed in the 
opposite direction of biases held by nondepressed indiv-
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iduals (Bradley, 1983; Crocker, Kayne, & Alloy, 1985; Pysz-
czynski, Holt, & Greenberg, 1987). Lewinsohn et al. (1982) 
and Munoz and Lewinsohn (unpublished manuscript) have sug-
gested that a negative view of oneself is uniquely related 
to depression and thus provides partial support for Beck's 
cognitive triad of depression, although other research does 
not support their conclusion (Gibson & Becker, 1973a; 
Martin, Ward, & Clark, 1983). 
In the more depressed alcoholic, then, there is the 
potential for two opposing biases, the interaction of which 
cannot readily be predicted on the basis of empirical liter-
ature. Woodruff et al. (1973b) found depressed alcoholics 
to be more like nondepressed alcoholics than like patients 
with unipolar affective disorder, whereas Gibson and Becker 
(1973a) found depressed alcoholics' resp?nses to the Beck 
Depression Inventory to closely resemble those of primary 
depressives. Inasmuch as Gibson and Becker's (1973a) study 
focused on the cognitive organization of depression, its 
results are more likely to be predictive for this study. 
Thus, based on these studies, the following were also hypo-
thesized: 
Hypothesis 4. More depressed subjects will show a 
negative bias in personal expectations regarding 
the consequences of their drinking. 
Hypothesis 5. This negative bias will be limited to 
expectancies for personal wellbeing, and not global 
expectations for others. 
Hypothesis 6. More depressed alcoholics will show a 
negative bias as well, and given the adverse conse-
quences of their drinking, will be more extreme in 
their bias than depressed nonalcoholic medical 
patients. 
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It is clear that the most extreme risk of alcoholism 
is premature death. However, a review of the literature on 
death attitudes and life-threatening behavior showed few 
consistent relationships regarding the death attitudes of 
the addictive population. Feifel and Nagy (1980) found few 
significant differences in the death attitudes of alcoholics 
and controls, while Kumar, Vaidya, and Dwivedi (1982) found 
subgroup differences in the death attitudes of different 
types of alcoholics. Smokers and heroin addicts have evi-
denced a somewhat morbid orientation toward their deaths 
(Gertler, Ferneau, & Raynes, 1973; Resnik & Wittlin, 1973; 
Schwebal & Kaemmerer, 1977). Death anxiety shows some cor-
relation with suicidal risk, a weak correlation with depres-
sion, and no clear correlation with age or health status 
(Lucas, 1974; Pollack, 1979; Wagner & Lorion, 1984). A num-
ber of studies have shown attitudes toward personal death to 
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be distinct from more general attitudes toward death (Dev-
ins, 1979; Durlak & Kass, 1981; Durlak, 1982; Durlak & Kasi-
matis, in press). On the basis of these findings, the fol-
lowing was hypothesized: 
Hypothesis 7: The positive bias of less depressed sub-
jects and the negative bias of depressed subjects will 
be evident only in evaluations of personal death, not 
in evaluations of others' deaths. 
Thus it was anticipated that alcoholics would show 
significantly more extreme biases in their evaluations of 
their personal health risks and mortality. Depression was 
expected to determine the direction of the bias for both the 
experimental and comparison groups. 
METHOD 
I. Subjects 
Subjects were selected from three outpatient programs 
at the V.A. Medical Center in Milwaukee, Wisconsin: the 
alcohol dependence treatment program, the aftercare (sobri-
ety maintenance) program, and the hypertension clinic. 
Participation was strictly voluntary, and involved filling 
out a number of self-report measures. All subjects were 
male and were informally screened for exclusion of any Axis 
I psychiatric disorders other than nonpsychotic depression 
or substance abuse. This criterion was included as higher 
rates of some forms of psychopathology have been reported 
among depressed, versus nondepressed, alcoholics (Hessel-
brock et al. 1985). 
Hypertensive outpatients were chosen as a comparison 
group because they were expected to show a range of diff i-
cul ties with depression and health problems, and their dis-
ease requires, like alcoholism, some changes in lifestyle. 
Hypertension patients are also similar to alcoholic subjects 
in that the exacerbation of their disease is to some extent 
under their control. Additionally, research suggests that a 
comparison group of medical patients can be expected to be 
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more similar to alcoholics in terms of demographic back-
ground, life stressors, personality traits, and range of 
severity of depressive symptoms than would be primary 
depressives (Woodruff et al, 1973b; Hamm, Major, & Brown, 
1979; Coryell, Pfohl, & Zimmerman, 1984; Lloyd, 1984). 
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Sampling from an outpatient population was expected to 
avoid some of the stresses and depression attributable to 
extended lengths of stay in a hospital, involving disrup-
tions of jobs and separations from families. Similarly, 
alcoholics at two different points in treatment were sampled 
in an attempt to identify changes in cognitions across 
treatment and levels of depression (Nakamura et al., 1983). 
Additionally, all outpatient groups had received some educa-
tion regarding the nature and treatment of their diseases, 
which ruled out the possibility of ignorance regarding the 
potential risks associated with their conditions. Five 
hypertensive subjects reporting a significant drinking 
problem, as evidenced by either prior treatment for alcohol-
ism or a Short Michigan Alcoholism Screening Test (SMAST) 
score of three or more, were excluded from the sample. Sim-
ilarly, nine alcoholics were excluded who reported treatment 
for hypertension. The final groups contained forty subjects 
each. The overall intent was to establish three groups of 
subjects differing in their experience with alcohol but 
relatively equivalent in their demographic backgrounds. 
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II. Procedure 
Alcoholic subjects were solicited from the group 
therapy sessions of both the outpatient alcohol dependence 
treatment and the aftercare programs. Hypertensive patients 
were recruited individually as they waited for their medical 
appointments. The experimenter briefly described the purpose 
of the study and explained what participation would entail. 
Subjects were also informed of the confidentiality of their 
responses and their right to withdraw at any time. Volun-
teers were then asked to sign an informed consent sheet and 
given a packet of measures. The measures appeared in coun-
terbalanced order and were identifiable only by a subject 
number. Some subjects filled out the forms with an experi-
menter present; others received a postage-paid envelope in 
which to return their forms. Of those who agreed to parti-
cipate in the study (slightly over 70% of those solicited), 
there was a 82% return rate with only seven instances of 
incomplete data. 
III. Materials 
Utility of Self-Report Measures. All measures used in 
this study were self-report instruments. There was no ~ 
priori basis for questioning the validity of the responses 
of the comparison group, and previous research suggests that 
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most alcoholics give valid self-reports. In a frequently 
cited study, Sobell and Sobell (1975) reported that out-
patient alcoholics in voluntary treatment gave valid and 
reliable reports of their personal and drinking histories. 
Responses to structured interviews were compared to patient 
records and were found to be 86% valid, with most of the 
invalid interview responses being overestimates of the 
recorded behaviors. Over 90% of the responses were reliable 
when retested after a three week interval (Sobell & Sobell, 
1975). Only subjects in treatment because of a court order 
offered less reliable data, and the authors recommended 
excluding these subjects for research purposes. However, 
Sobell and Sobell (1978) later reported that, for alcoholics 
in outpatient treatment, court-ordered patients gave just as 
valid self-reports as did voluntary patients for both alco-
hol- and nonalcohol-related questions, again with invalid 
self-reports typically involving a significant over-report-
ing of the behaviors (Sobel! & Sobel!, 1978). 
Polich (1982) interviewed alcoholics and their col-
laterals four years post-treatment, and reported results 
consistent with earlier studies: self-reports of concrete 
drinking problems were generally valid, although some sub-
jects tended to underestimate recent drinking. However, 
overall the self-reports were consistent with the reports of 
collaterals, with discrepencies mostly involving over-
reporting by the alcoholics. Polich (1982) recommended 
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treating self-reports as valid but utilizing multiple meas-
ures since validity varied with the types of self-reports. 
Similarly, Stacy et al. (1985) found satisfactory validity 
for self-reports of several types of substance abuse, 
including alcohol use. 
Several studies also indicate that direct measures are 
at least as valid as indirect measures of death attitudes. 
Littlefield and Fleming (1984) reported significant positive 
correlations between direct and indirect measures of death 
anxiety. Handel et al. (1984} found that direct measures of 
death anxiety were statistically and meaningfully corre-
lated to each other, whereas a lack of any significant cor-
relations among the indirect measures raised a question as 
to their validity. The authors found no consistent rela-
tionships between direct measures of death anxiety and 
indirect measures, or with the variables of social desira-
bility or age. Durlak and Kasimatis's (in press) multi-
trait-multimethod study demonstrated the validity of the two 
death attitude scales used in the present study, and their 
results were replicated in a subsequent study (Kasimatis & 
Durlak, unpublished manuscript). Thus, self-report measures 
have been shown to provide valid and reliable data on both 
alcohol- and nonalcohol-related behaviors, and for reports 
of death anxiety. 
Independent Measures. Subjects were asked to complete 
a demographic questionnaire, the Short Michigan Alcoholism 
screening Test, the Sensation Seeking Scale Form V, the 
short form of the Social Desirability Scale, and the Beck 
Depression Inventory. A copy of each measure used is in 
Appendix A. 
52 
Demographic Questionnaire. The demographic question-
naire was developed for this study. Aside from standard 
information regarding age, race, marital status, etc., the 
respondents were asked to rate, on a seven-point Lickert 
scale, the degree of significant change in their lives in 
the last year. This measure of life change was used as an 
index of personal stress (Lloyd, 1984). Since both alco-
holism (Selzer et al., 1977; Rychtarik et al., 1987) and 
depression (Petty & Nasrullah, 1981; Layne, 1983; Nezu & 
Ronan, 1985; Krantz, 1985) have been shown to be associated 
with increased rates of stress, this item assessed whether 
the groups were comparable in terms of the perceived diffi-
culties in their lives. If not, any effects of this dimen-
sion could then be isolated in the data analyses. 
Short Michisan Alcoholism Screening Test (SMAST). The 
SMAST (Selzer, Vinokur, & van Rooijan, 1975) is the short 
form of the revised MAST, originally developed by Selzer 
(1971). The original MAST is a twenty-four item self-report 
measure with acceptable degrees of reliability and validity. 
MAST cutoff scores correctly identify 99% of alcoholic res-
pondents (Selzer, 1971). Zung and Charalampous's (1975b) 
item analysis of the MAST yielded additional support for its 
53 
internal validity. Three of the four weakest items identi-
fied in Zung and Charalampous's (1975b) study are among the 
items excluded in the SMAST, which contains only thirteen 
items from the original scale but possesses comparable val-
idity, reliability, and distribution of scores. The SMAST 
also shows weak correlations with age and denial, and a 
score of three or more has been recommended as a criterion 
for alcohol abuse (Selzer, Vinokur, & van Rooijan, 1975). 
Sensation Seeking Scale Form V (SSS). The SSS is a 
forty-item forced-choice measure, the product of a number of 
revisions and validations of the scale first developed by 
Zuckerman et al.(1964). The original scale consisted of 
fifty-four items designed to quantify the construct of opti-
mal stimulation level. Items are in a forced-choice format 
for indicating preferences for extremes of sensation, for 
familiarity and routines, for enjoyment of danger and adven-
ture, and for the stimulation value of others. A general 
factor of sensation seeking, independent of measures of 
anxiety and psychopathology, was validated for both men and 
women undergraduates (Zuckerman & Link, 1968). Originally 
conceptualized as a desire for "optimal level of arousal,'' 
sensation seeking has more recently been theorized as 
reflecting differential biological sensitivity to stimula-
tion as reinforcement (Galazio, Rosenthal, & Stein, 1983). 
Subsequent factor analyses and cross-cultural valida-
tion established the reliability of three factors-- Thrill 
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and Adventure Seeking, Experience Seeking, and Disinhibi-
tion-- plus a less reliable factor of Boredom Susceptibility 
(Zuckerman, 1971; Zuckerman, Eysenck, & Eysenck, 1978). 
Total scores consistently decline with age (Zuckerman, 
Eysenck, & Eysenck, 1978). Both total scores and Disinhi-
bition factor scores have shown significant correlations 
with alcohol and drug use in a number of different popula-
tions (Zuckerman, 1971; Galazio, Rosenthal, & Stein, 1983). 
Social Desirabilty Scale (SDS). As a validity check, a 
short form of the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale 
was included in the present study, as recommended by Stacy 
et al. (1985). The original SDS (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960) is 
a measure of social desirability as a response tendency with 
self-report instruments. It contains 33 items describing 
relatively rare culturally approved behaviors, endorsement 
of which is minimally related to clinical psychopathology 
(Crowne & Marlowe, 1960). Reynolds (1982) developed a thir-
teen item short form of the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desira-
bility Scale with an acceptable level of reliability (~= 
.76), item-total score correlations ranging from .32 to .47, 
and an overall correlation of .93 (R<.01) with the original 
SDS. 
Beck Depression Inventory (BDI). The BDI is a widely 
used instrument in both research and the clinical treatment 
of depression. The measure was originally validated in two 
studies with psychiatric subjects, but has also demonstrated 
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its applicability with mildly depressed individuals, suici-
dal patients, medical patients, and alcoholics (Dobson & 
Breiter, 1983; Steer, McElroy, & Beck, 1983; Campbell, Bur-
gess, & Finch, 1984; Oliver & Simmons, 1985; Clark et al., 
1985). Reports of BDI reliability coefficients range from 
.86 to .93 (Kuiper & McCabe, 1985). The concurrent validity 
of the BDI has been shown with a number of criterion meas-
ures, including the Hamilton Rating Scale, Zung Self-Rating 
Scale for Depression, Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire, Dys-
functional Attitude Scale, and the depression subscale of 
the MMPI (Beck, Weissman, & Kovacs, 1976; Finkle, Glass, & 
Merluzzi, 1982; Dobson & Breiter, 1983; Hesselbrock et al., 
1983; Steer, McElroy, & Beck, 1983; Campbell, Burgess, & 
Finch, 1984). 
Hesselbrock et al. (1983) raised a question as to the 
specificity of the BDI for diagnosing depression in inpa-
tient alcoholics, using the Diagnostic Interview Schedule as 
their criterion measure. However, several methodological 
problems with their study, including potential confounds of 
sampling and treatment effects, make their results difficult 
to interpret (Hagan & Schauer, 1985; Hesselbrock et al., 
1985). Still, the authors' argument for comparable opera-
tional definitions of depression across studies has merit, 
and does lend additional significance to the generally wide 
support that has been found for the BDI's internal consis-
tency, test-retest reliability, and for the interpretation 
of the total score as a state measure of the cognitive 
aspects of depression (Dobson & Breiter, 1983; Campbell, 
Burgess, & Finch, 1984; Oliver & Simmons, 1985). 
56 
The BDI is a twenty-one item measure, in which respon-
dents are asked to select one of four statements that best 
describes themselves. The statements reflect a gradation of 
severity of a depressive symptom. Items are balanced to 
reflect cognitive, motivational, affective, and vegetative 
signs of depression. Total scores range from 0 to 63, with 
higher scores reflecting more· severe symptoms. Beck's ori-
ginal ranges for a normal population were: 10-15= mild, 
16-23= moderate, and 24+= severe depression (Oliver & Sim-
mons, 1984). Subsequently, ranges of 9-12, 13-15, and more 
than 15 representing, respectively, mild, moderate, and 
severe depression in normal and medical patients, have been 
recommended for research purposes (Beck, Weissman, & Kovacs, 
1976; Finkle, Glass, & Merluzzi, 1983; Campbell, Burgess, & 
Finch, 1984; Kuiper & McCabe, 1985). 
In summary, then, the data from the independent meas-
ures were obtained in order to assess the comparability of 
the three subject groups on several demographic variables, 
as well as for the range of scores for depression and per-
ceived life stressors. The potentially confounding factors 
of social desirability and sensation seeking were also 
assessed. SMAST scores of three or more, and/or reports of 
treatment for alcoholism, were used to corroborate group 
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assignment. 
Dependent Variables. The dependent variables in this 
study included a Future Health Inventory, adapted from Wein-
stein's (1982) format, Collett and Lester's (1969) Fear of 
Death of Others Scale, and Dickstein's (1972) Negative Eval-
uation of Death Scale. Also used was the revised short form 
of the Alcohol Effects Questionnaire (Brown et al., 1980; 
Rohsenow, 1983). Copies of these measures are in Appendix 
B. 
The Future Health Inventory (FHI) and the short form 
of the Alcohol Effects Questionnaire (AEQ) were developed 
and validated in a pilot study with fifty-six volunteer sub-
jects from the V.A. hospital domiciliary. In the Human Sub-
jects Review Committee of the V.A. Medical Center, a ques-
tion was raised as to the subjects' ability to manage the 
formats and length of the proposed measures. A pilot study 
was thus developed to assess the clarity of the instructions 
of the FHI and to see which of two measures, the Subjective 
Probability Questionnaire (SPQ) (Lewinsohn et al., 1982) or 
the Alcohol Effects Questionnaire (AEQ) (Brown et al., 1980; 
Rohsenow, 1983), was more amenable to a short form version. 
A detailed description of the pilot study can be found in 
Appendix c. The subjects showed no difficulty with the 
instructions or the format of the FHI. The measure also had 
acceptable test-retest reliability, with an average corre-
lation of~= .58. 
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The results of the pilot study also supported the use 
of the revised AEQ for the present study. The AEQ was sim-
pler in format, and its content focused on expectations of 
reinforcement from alcohol. Item-scale, part-whole, and 
simultaneous multiple correlations allowed construction of a 
shorter form of the AEQ that maintained comparable or bet-
ter item-scale correlations, ranging from ~= .38 to .86. 
The results of the pilot thus validated the used of the FHI 
and the short form of the AEQ for the purposes of the pres-
ent study. 
Future Health Inventory (FHI). The FHI was adapted 
from the format used by Weinstein (1982) to assess percep-
tions of susceptibility to various health problems. Respon-
dents estimated their risk for sixteen different health 
problems relative to the risk for other men their age. They 
were asked to assess their comparative risk on a seven-point 
continuum ranging from (-3) much below average to (+3) much 
above average. The items ranged from relatively minor prob-
lems such as gum disease to more serious conditions such as 
lung cancer. The content was balanced to include items that 
were hypothesized to be relevant for alcoholism (e.g., liver 
disease), hypertension (stroke), both conditions (ulcer), or 
neither (strep throat). The relevance of the items was 
assumed to be obvious and not dependent on any special know-
ledge: that is, subjects' participation in the educational 
segment of their treatment would be sufficient to acquaint 
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them with the relevancy of these items for their conditions. 
Alcohol Effects Questionnaire (AEQ), The original AEQ 
is an eighty item measure of beliefs about the effects of 
alcohol. Forty self-referent and forty other-referent 
statements are presented, which subjects rate as true or 
false based on their own experience. The items load onto 
eight expectancy scales, for which Rohsenow (1983) reports 
internal consistency ratings (using Cronbach's alpha) rang-
ing from .49 to .74. Six of the subscales relate to expec-
tations of positive consequences of drinking: specifically, 
for global positive experiences, social and physical pleas-
ure, sexual enhancement, increased power or aggression, 
increased social assertiveness, and relaxation or tension 
reduction. Two additional subscales measure expectations of 
the negative consequences of impairment and carelessness. 
The short form of the AEQ, validated in the pilot study, 
contained only 70 items but showed comparable internal con-
sistancy and test-retest reliability (cf. Appendix C). 
Death Attitude Scales. The two death attitude meas-
ures selected for this study both demonstrate convergent and 
discriminant validity for attitudes towards death of self 
and death of others (Durlak and Kasimatis, accepted for 
publiction). Collett and Lester's (1969) Fear of Death of 
Others Scale is a seven-item measure of the degree of one's 
negative reaction to the possible death of family members or 
close friends. There is a five-point continuum of agreement 
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to both positively and negatively worded statements such as, 
"I could not accept the finality of the death of a friend." 
A higher score reflects more concern about the loss of loved 
ones. 
Negative views of one's own death are measured by 
Dickstein's (1972) Negative Evaluation of Death Scale. The 
scale contains five items such as, "The prospect of my own 
death depresses me." The respondents state their agreement 
with each item along a four-point continuum. As with the 
other death attitude scale, higher scores indicate more 
negative attitudes. 
IV. Analyses 
The original proposal suggested the use of two-way 
ANOVA's and multivariate 2x3x2 repeated measures MANOVA's to 
test for significant main effects and the interaction of 
group membership and degree of depression. Initial descrip-
tive analyses, however, indicated the need for hierarchical 
multiple regression analyses. Specifically, there were some 
significant differences between group means on some demo-
graphic variables such as age (~= 12.55, ~<.001). Also, 
examination of the group means and the grand correlation 
matrix suggested the need to partial out the effects of the 
potential confounding variables of stress, sensation seek-
ing, and social desirability. And most importantly, the 
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distribution of the BDI scores was positively skewed in such 
a way as to preclude any meaningful separation into low, 
medium, and high groups (Table 1). 
Hierarchical multiple regression analyses were selec-
ted for a number of reasons. First of all, multiple regres-
sion correlations can incorporate a variety of coded data, 
including nominal categories and continuous variables. BDI 
scores could then be retained as a continuous variable, more 
clearly reflecting the distribution of scores. Secondly, 
multiple regression correlations index the association 
between a dependent variable and an optimally weighted com-
bination of multiple independent variables, testing the sig-
nificance of the combined independent variables as well as 
the unique contribution of each independent variable. The 
amount of the dependent variable variance accounted for 
uniquely by a particular independent variable is expressed 
as a semipartial (sr) correlation, and its significance is 
assessed with a 1-test. Using multiple regression corre-
lations thus permits analysis of the collective and indi-
vidual influences of the independent variables. 
By utilizing a hierarchical procedure, an analysis of 
covariance could be incorporated by first entering the 
potentially confounding independent variables as a set. 
Their effects are then partialled before testing the hypo-
thesized main predictors. Similarly, main effects must be 
partialled before testing interaction variables. 
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TABLE 1: Distribution of BDI Scores 
BDI SCORE RANGES 
0-4 5-9 10-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-36 
GROUP (ti) 
Outpatient 40 9 6 6 6 9 1 3 
Alcoholic 
Aftercare 40 11 12 11 1 3 1 1 
Alcoholic 
Hyperten- 40 10 12 9 5 3 1 0 
sive 
Combined 120 30 30 26 12 15 3 4 
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Thus, the multiple regressions were run in three 
stages, entering first the covariates, then testing for main 
effects of depression and group membership, and then for the 
interactions of depression and group membership. This 
hierarchical approach was the most conservative test possi-
ble, as any shared variance between the covariates and the 
variables of interest was attributed solely to the covari-
ates in the first stage of the analyses. This conserva-
tive apportioning of variance minimized the likelihood of 
spurious significant main effects or interactions due to the 
number of variables in the regression equations. 
RESULTS 
Comparability of Groups. Group means were examined 
with one-way between-group ANOVA's for all independent vari-
ables. These data are summarized in Table 2. Overall the 
groups were highly comparable, i.e. showed no significant 
differences in terms of most demographic variables, includ-
ing years of education ([= .59) and socioeconomic status ([= 
2.97). The only significant demographic differences were in 
terms of age (f= 12.55, p<.001) and perceived life stress 
(~= 11.53, E<.001). In both instances the greatest differ-
ence was between the hypertension and the two alcoholic 
groups, with the hypertension group being older and report-
ing less life change or stress. The outpatient alcoholic, 
aftercare, and hypertension groups reported very similar and 
relatively low BDI scores, with respective means of 13.6 
(SD= 9), 11 (SD=7.7), and 9.3 (SD=6.6), 
As anticipated, SMAST score differences were highly 
significant (f= 190.5, p<.001), reflecting their use to 
corroborate group assignment. Less anticipated was the 
strong social desirability difference ([= 8.93, p<.001), 
wherein again the hypertensive group differed more from the 
two other groups, showing more social desirability effects. 
The hypertensive subjects also differed significantly from 
64 















47.35 ( 11. 6) 
12.12 ( 1. 7) 
1. 35 (.88) 
5.65 ( 1. 6) 
13.62 (9.0) 
9.88 ( 2. 9) 
4,55 ( 3. 1) 
15.98 ( 7. 5) 
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ANOVA's on Independent Variables 
GROUP 
Aftercare Hypertension £'.(2,117) 
!1 (SD) !1 (SD) 
45.85 (11.2) 57.30 (10.0) 12.55 *** 
12.60 ( 1. 8) 12.30 ( 2. 3) .59 
1. 78 ( 1. 1) 1. 95 ( 2. 0) 2.97 
4.92 ( 1. 5) 3.78 (2.0) 11. 53 *** 
10.95 ( 7. 7) 9.32 (6.6) 2.97 
10.18 ( 2. 5) 1.18 ( 1. 4) 190.50 *** 
4.42 (2.6) 6.88 ( 2. 9) 8.93 *** 
18.58 ( 5. 9) 12.95 (6.9) 6.66 
** 
66 
the alcoholic groups in reporting less sensation seeking 
behavior (E= 6.66, ~<.01). Examination of the grand corre-
lation matrix revealed significant correlations between age 
and the independent variables of social desirability (~= 
.36, ~<.001) and sensation seeking (~= -.46, ~<.001). The 
overlap of variance between these variables suggested that 
they were confounded with each other, as well as potential 
confounds of the dependent variables. 
Thus, there were either empirical or theoretical bases 
for retaining the independent variables of age, life stress, 
social desirability, and sensation seeking as covariates to 
be included in the first stage of the multiple regression 
analyses. The covariates were treated as potential con-
founds, and their effects were partialled out in the first 
stage of the multiple regressions, in order to provide a 
cleaner and more stringent test for the hypothesized main 
effects and interactions of depression and group membership. 
For the purposes of the analyses, dummy coding was 
employed to allow comparisons between the outpatient alco-
holic (OP) group and both the aftercare (AF) and hyperten-
sive (HY) groups: dummy coding represents membership in ttg•• 
mutually exclusive groups in a series of ttg-1'' dichotomies 
(Cohen & Cohen, 1975). In other words, the outpatient alco-
holies were treated as the reference group against which to 
compare the scores of the aftercare group and the hyperten-
sive group. The remaining set of comparisons, between the 
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aftercare and hypertensive groups, were calculated from the 
mean square of residuals from the regression equations, with 
an adjustment of the degrees of freedom (cf. Cohen & Cohen, 
p. 186). Through the multiple regression equations and the 
subsequent analyses of the residual variance, the signifi-
cant covariate effects, main effects, and interactions were 
identified. 
I. First Stage of the Multiple Regression Analyses 
Table 3 summarizes the pattern of covariate effects 
identified in the first stage of the analyses. In this 
first stage, any dependent variable variance attributable to 
age, social desirability, life stress, or sensation seeking 
was isolated and tested for its significance. Despite group 
differences, the effect of age was not significant for any 
of the dependent variables, probably an artifact of its 
shared variance with the other variables of social desira-
bility and sensation seeking. Social desirability had a 
significant inverse relationship to every one of the self-
referent dependent variables, as well as for the "global 
positive feelings" subscale of the other-referent version of 
the AEQ. The t values ranged from -5.48 (~<.001), for the 
- ' 
"power" subscale, to -2.03 (~<.05) for the "relaxation" 
subscale. This suggests a defensive bias on the part of 
many of the subjects, particularly in terms of how they 
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TABLE 3: Covariate Effects from the First Stage 
of the Multiple Regression Analyses 
COVARIATES 
age social sensation life 
desirability seeking stress 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Self-referent 
FHI -0.93 -3.39 
*** 
1. 30 -0.39 
AEQ 





pleasure -0.12 -2.82 
** 
1. 71 -1.01 
sexual 0.78 -2.11 * 2.21 * -1. 55 
power 0.44 -5.48 *** 2.14 * 1.64 
social 0.57 -3.26 ** 3.34 *** 0.32 
relaxation -0.65 -2.03 * 2.26 ** -0.13 
impairment -1. 26 -2.25 * -0.09 2.24 * 
carelessness -0.44 -3.15 ** 1. 23 2.07 * 
NEGATIVE EVALUA-
TION OF OWN DEATH -0.95 -2.61 * -1. 24 -0.96 
Other-referent 
AEQ 
global 1. 83 -3.06 ** -1. 94 








sexual -0.10 0.21 
power -0.62 -1. 82 
social -0.94 -0.96 
relaxation -1. 38 0.50 
impairment 0.17 -0.28 
carelessness -0.29 -0.70 
FEAR OF DEATH 
OF OTHERS -0.91 2.01 * 















described themselves and their own vulnerabilities. In 
general, subjects with higher social desirability scores 
tended to acknowledge fewer concerns or negative views about 
their health risks, their susceptibility to alcohol, or 
their own deaths. A social desirability effect was also 
evidenced for Collett & Lester's (1969) Fear of Death of 
Others Scale, although in the opposite direction (1= 2.01, 
R<.05). It seems, then, that subjects presenting them-
selves in a socially desirable light endorsed significantly 
fewer negative attitudes toward their own deaths but more 
negative or fearful ones for the deaths of others. 
Sensation seeking proved to have a significant effect 
for all but one of the self-referent AEQ subscales that 
measure anticipation of positive effects from drinking. In 
other words, sensation seeking showed a strong positive 
relationship to personal expectations of positive consequen-
ces of drinking, including global positive feelings (1= 
2.50, R<.05), feelings of sexual enhancement (1= 2.21, 
R<.05), power (1= 2.14, R<.05), social assertion (1= 3.34, 
R<.001), and relaxation (1= 2.26, R<.01). Conversely, among 
the self-referent measures, the perception of personal 
stress, as measured by recent life change, was significantly 
related to only the two subscales describing the negative 
consequences of drinking, namely impairment (1= 2.24, R<.05) 
and carelessness (1= 2.07, R<.05). This relationship was 
positive, suggesting that those subjects experiencing higher 
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levels of stress were more conscious of the adverse conse-
quences of drinking. The variable of personal stress also 
showed a negative relationship to one of the other-referent 
positive expectancy subscales-- for enhancement of pleasure 
(~= -2.10, ~<.05)-- suggesting that more stressed subjects 
also perceived drinking as less pleasurable generally. 
II. Second Stage of the Multiple Regression Analyses 
With the effects of social desirability, sensation 
seeking, and stress partialled out in the first stage of the 
multiple regression analyses, the second stage tested for 
significant self-other differences and for the main effects 
of depression and group membership. These findings are sum-
marized in Tables 4 & 5. It should be noted that the signs 
of these values are a function of the dummy coding, and 
their interpretation was based on examination of group means 
and variable intercorrelations, as well as individual sub-
ject scores for interaction effects. 
As hypothesized, there were significant differences in 
the scores of the self-referent and other referent measures. 
The two versions of the AEQ showed that subjects never con-
sidered themselves to be more influenced by alcohol than 
were others. In fact, in 22 of 24 appraisals (92%) of the 
potential consequences of drinking, all subject groups 
viewed themselves as less affected by alcohol than were 
TABLE 4: Summary of Group Means for 
AEQ and Death Attitude Scales 
ABQ SUBSCALBS 
Outpatient 
rn.= 40 > 
referent 
self other 
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AF vs. HY BDI x 
2.56 * 
4.29 *** 
2. 82 ** 
4,49 *** 
3. 00 ** 
2. 75 ** 
2.17 * 
2. 78 ** 
-2.30 * 
OP vs. HY 
2.07 * 
Note. ~-tests of main effects (1,112) and interactions (1,110) 





others. This self-other difference proved to be significant 
for every one of the AEQ subscales, as well as for the meas-
ures of attitudes toward death. Table 4 includes i-tests of 
the adjusted self-other score differences, and Appendix D 
contains a description of how the difference scores were 
derived. As hypothesized, scores of self-referent measures 
were significantly less than those of other-referent meas-
ures, with i values ranging from 2.29 to 7.55. Contrary to 
hypotheses, there were no significant group differences in 
terms of degree of self-other discrepency, except that the 
outpatient alcoholics showed significantly less self-other 
difference in expectations of alcohol-related impairment 
than did the hypertensive subjects (E= 3.37, ~<.05). 
In terms of group membership, there were no signifi-
cant differences between the outpatient and aftercare 
groups. Not surprisingly, there were also no significant 
interactions between this group comparison and BDI scores. 
However, a number of group main effects were found in com-
parisons of each of the alcoholic groups with the hyper-
tensive group. Overall, the pattern of effects indicate 
little difference between the two alcoholic groups, while 
alcoholics differed from the nonalcoholic comparison group 
in having significantly more positive expectations of alco-
hol consumption for themselves, and more positive and fewer 
negative perceptions of drinking in general. While differ-
ences in expectations were not, as hypothesized, strictly 
self-referent, they were stronger in reference to oneself 
than for others (see Table 5). 
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For example, compared to the hypertension group, the 
outpatient alcoholics anticipated significantly more pleas-
ure (i= -3.31, R<.001), social assertion (i= -2.94, R<.01), 
and relaxation (i= -2.23, R<.05) for themselves, and sig-
nificantly more global positive feelings (i= -2.07, R<.05) 
and less impairment (i= 2.46, R<.05) for others who drink. 
The aftercare group also described significantly stronger 
expectations of pleasure (i= 4~29, R<.001), social asser-
tion (i= 4.49, R<.001), and relaxation (i= 3.00, R<.01), as 
well as global positive feelings (i= 2.56, R<.05), and 
feelings of enhanced power (i= 2.82, R<.01) for themselves. 
The aftercare group also differed from the hypertension 
group in their expectations for others to experience more 
global positive feelings (i= 2.75, R<.01), enhanced pleas-
ure (i= 2.17, R<.05) and sexual feelings (i= 2.78, R<.01), 
and decreased impairment (i= -2.30, R<.05). 
Examination of the group means (Table 4) indicated 
that, as hypothesized, the two alcoholic groups, while 
describing themselves as less affected by alcohol than 
others, still expected to experience significantly more 
benefits from drinki.ng than did the hypertensive subjects. 
However, the minimalization of potential alcohol-related 
impairment was not, as hypothesized, self-referent but 
rather other-referent, describing drinkers in general. It 
was only among more depressed subjects that this vulnera-
bility to impairment was consistently self-referent or 
internalized (Table 5). 
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As hypothesized, level of depression had a significant 
main effect for several of the self-referent but none of the 
other-referent dependent variables. Specifically, depres-
sion showed a significant positive relationship to percep-
tions of personal health risk (i= 3.77, ~<.001), and to 
expectations of sexual enhancement (i= 1.99, ~<.05), social 
assertion (i= 2.03, ~<.05), and potential impairment from 
drinking (~= 2.05, ~<.05). Depression's association with 
expectations of relaxation from drinking also approached 
significance (i= 1.95, ~<.10). The more depressed subjects 
thus reported more personal vulnerability to illness, or to 
being affected by drinking. Essentially, more depressed 
subjects had less illusion of personal invulnerability. 
However, the more depressed subjects' drinking-related 
expectations were not negative in all areas. While they did 
anticipate significantly more impairment, they also had 
stronger expectations of enhancement of their own sexual and 
social feelings from drinking, compared to less depressed 
subjects. In all, the significant effect of depression for 
several self-referent but no other-referent measures lends 
support to the hypothesized relevancy of depression for 
influencing personal but not general perceptions of vulnera-
bility. While depression's effect was specifically self-
referent, it was not a simple one, as it involved enhance-
ment of both positive and negative expectations regarding 
the consequences of drinking. 
III. Third Stage of the Multiple Regression Analyses 
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The final stage of the analyses tested for significant 
interactions between group membership and level of depres-
sion. Only one significant interaction was identified: 
level of depression interacted with the outpatient alco-
holic-hypertension group comparison for expectations of per-
sonal impairment (i= 2.07, ~<.05). The interpretation of 
this interaction is not straightforward, primarily because 
substantial scatter in scores, especially among the less 
depressed subjects, obscures any clear trend in the rela-
tionship (see Figures 1 & 2). Generally, degree of depres-
sion is positively related to degree of perceived personal 
impairment from drinking for both the outpatient and hyper-
tensive subjects, and this relationship is stronger at 
higher levels of depression. While the direction of this 
relationship is as expected, the interaction occurs because 
the depression-impairment relationship is relatively 
stronger for the hypertension group, contrary to the hypo-
theses. In other words, the level of depression had rela-
tively less, not more, influence on perception of personal 
impairment for alcoholic (versus nonalcoholic) subjects. 
FIGURE 1: Interaction of Depression by Alcoholic 
Group for Expectancy of Impairment 
OUTPATIENT ALCOHOLIC GROUP 
Impairment 
5 0 0 
4 0 0 000 
3 0 
2 0 0 0 
1 
0 0 0 





FIGURE 2: Interaction of Depression by Hypertensive 















The present study investigated the effects of level of 
depression on male alcoholics' expectations of personal risk 
or harm. It was hypothesized that less depressed subjects 
would be optimisitcally biased, whereas more depressed sub-
jects would be more sober and realistic in their appraisals 
of their personal vulnerability, whether specific to the 
consequences of drinking or more broadly in reference to 
personal health and mortality.· It was also hypothesized 
that this bias would be specific to personal expectations, 
and that it would be more pronounced among alcoholic sub-
jects. 
In general, the data supported most of these hypothe-
ses. Level of depression was positively associated with 
perceptions of vulnerability to the effects of drinking and 
to general health risks, although it was not significantly 
related to attitudes toward death. Depression's effect was, 
as hypothesized, circumscribed to personal expectations; 
however, alcoholic and nonalcoholic subjects differed in 
terms of general as well as personal expectations of the 
consequences of alcohol consumption. And the data failed to 
support the hypothesized interaction between alcoholism and 
depression, suggesting instead that the effects of depres-
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sion were highly comparable for alcoholic and nonalcoholic 
subjects alike. Before discussing these findings at length, 
however, some consideration should be given to the variables 
"partialled out'' in the first stage of the analyses, since 
the main effects identified can only be interpreted in the 
context of the covariates that had been taken into account. 
I. Correlates of the Self-Report Data 
Exclusive reliance on self-report measures necessarily 
raises a question as to the validity of the current data. 
Alcoholics in particular are notorious for their defensive 
presentations of themselves, and on a common sense level, 
their self-reports would be especially suspect, despite such 
findings as those of Sobel! & Sobel! (1975) and Polich 
(1982), that indicate that alcoholics do give valid self-
reports. For the purposes of this research, self-report 
measures were clearly the most direct method of assessing 
subjects' expectations; validity questions would also be 
raised for less direct methods such as therapist rating 
scales, or inferences of motives from observed behavior. 
Also, alcoholic subjects in treatment could conceivably per-
ceive a demand to emphasize more negative views of drinking 
and its consequences. Sampling subjects at two different 
points in treatment and including a measure of social desir-
ability effects were intended to help address the question 
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of the validity of responses. 
Social desirability, in fact, proved to be a potent 
intervening variable, particularly in relation to the self-
referent dependent variables. The significant social desir-
ability effect for all of the "self" measures but only two 
of the ''other" measures is consistent with Kuiper's (1979) 
and Guidano and Liotti's (1983) theories that information 
about oneself is organized and evaluated differently from 
other, more general knowledge or beliefs. Subjects with a 
more socially desirable response style were distinctly more 
defensive in their presentations of themselves, describing 
less vulnerability to general health problems or to any 
effects, positive or negative, from drinking. Social desir-
ability also showed a very distinct relationship to atti-
tudes toward death, being inversely related to negative 
evaluations of personal death but positively associated with 
fear of death of others. Apparently subjects viewed expres-
sions of concern over the loss of loved ones to be more soc-
ially acceptable than expressions of negative feelings about 
one's own death. Again, this was consistent with a general 
pattern of describing less concern and/or perception of per-
sonal vulnerability. It is also consistent with Feifel and 
Nagy's (1980) report that alcoholics reported little con-
scious fear or concern about their deaths. 
Social desirability, then, was an important variable 
to take into account. It is noteworthy, however, that sig-
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nificantly higher social desirability scores were found in 
the hypertension comparison group, not within the alcoholic 
groups. Thus, the use of this scale revealed more defen-
siveness (at least in terms of social desirability) in the 
nonalcoholic comparison group. Similar findings have been 
reported by Selzer, Vinokur, and Wilson (1977), who found 
that alcoholics in treatment were less defensive than either 
alcoholics not in treatment or control subjects. 
Two other variables significantly influenced the self-
report data: sensation seeking and life stress. The effects 
of these varaibles were more limited and somewhat recipro-
cal. Sensation seeking was strongly associated with per-
sonal expectations of positive consequences of drinking, 
including enhancement of feelings of sexuality, power, 
social assertion, and relaxation. Sensation seekers, then, 
may be especially sensitive to alcohol as a source of rein-
forcing sensations-- in line with Galazio, Rosenthal and 
Stein's (1983) conceptualization of sensation seeking as a 
reflection of a distinct biological sensitivity to stimula-
tion as reinforcement. It has been suggested that sensation 
seeking may be associated with a strong biological responsi-
vity to alcohol, possibly even a biological predisposition 
to addiction, for a certain subset of drinkers (Zuckerman, 
1971; Galazio, Rosenthal & Stein, 1983; Brown & Munson, 
1987). In this study, alcoholic subjects as a group did have 
significantly higher sensation seeking scores, although the 
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hypertensive subjects were also older, and sensation seek-
ing has been shown to decline with age (Zuckerman, Eysenck, 
& Eysenck, 1978). Thus these data cannot really address the 
question of the possible physiological underpinnings of 
expectations of reinforcement from drinking, although this 
area certainly warrants further study. 
Life stress was also important in that subjects repor-
ting more life change or stress anticipated significantly 
more impairment and carelessness to result from their own 
drinking, and significantly less pleasure for others who 
drank. Again, as a group the alcoholic subjects reported 
significantly more life change than the comparison group, 
similar to findings of Selzer et al. (1977) and Rychtarik et 
al. (1987). Entering treatment was undoubtedly a stressful 
experience for many of the alcoholic subjects, and for many 
was probably preceded by or concurrent with some kind of 
family, work, or legal problems. Layne (1983) and Krantz 
(1985) have suggested that the experience of more negative 
life events results in a less optimistic and more realistic 
appraisal of the potential for future misfortune. The 
stresses associated with treatment may have sensitized some 
alcoholic subjects to the adverse consequences of drinking. 
However, the degree of any such sensitization was apparently 
limited, since the alcoholics were still generally more pos-
itive than the nonalcoholics in their perceptions of the 
consequences of drinking, and all subject groups, regard-
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less of life stressors, described themselves as less influ-
enced by alcohol than others. Perhaps the experience of 
life stress at least allowed some alcoholics a more complex 
or differentiated set of expectancies in relation to alcohol 
consumption. 
Overall, the variables of social desirability, sensa-
tion seeking, and life stress were particularly influential 
in terms of the self-referent measures. Social desirability 
effects were not, as hypothesized, important for alcoholic 
subjects but rather for the nonalcoholic subjects. Gener-
ally, a socially desirable response style was associated 
with less expression of concern about personal vulnerabil-
ity. Sensation seeking demonstrated a distinct association 
with personal anticipation of positive feelings or sensa-
tions from drinking, whereas life stress was associated with 
more anticipation of personal impairment or carelessness. 
Utilization of a partialling technique proved valuable in 
evaluating the relevance of these variables for the self-
report data. More importantly, it allowed their effects to 
be isolated from the subsequent tests of the variables of 
interest. With the covariates taken into account, the 
strongest effects to emerge were those of depression and 
self-other differences in appraisal of risk. 
II. The Relevance of Depression 
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In this study, it was hypothesized that level of 
depression would prove to be significantly associated with 
subjects' perceptions of vulnerability or health risk. It 
was also hypothesized that this association would be circum-
scribed to personal, rather than general expectations. The 
data did in fact yield strong support for these hypotheses. 
Depression showed a significant main effect in relation to 
evaluations of personal health risk and for several of the 
AEQ subscales measuring expectations of personal consequen-
ces of drinking. However, depression failed to show any 
significant relationship with death attitudes, and only 
interacted significantly with group membership in reference 
to expectations of personal impairment from drinking. 
Specifically, the data yielded strong support for the 
hypothesis that depression would prove relevant for only 
personal expectancies: there was a significant main effect 
of depression for four of the ten self-referent but none of 
the nine other-referent dependent variables. Also, there 
was an additional self-referent AEQ scale (anticipation of 
relaxation) for which the effect of depression approached 
significance (i= 1.95,~<.10). The effect of depression was 
thus distinctly self-referent, as reported by Lewinsohn et 
al. (1982), Segal and Shaw (1986a), and Sweeney, Anderson, 
and Bailey (1986), 
Depression was associated with perceptions of greater 
personal health risk and vulnerability to the effects of 
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alcohol consumption. The strongest main effect for depres-
sion was in terms of perceived general health risk, as meas-
ured by the FHI (~= 3.77, ~<.001). The positive rela-
tionship between BDI and FHI scores indicates that more 
depressed subjects acknowledged significantly more potential 
to experience personal illness or injury. Because risk was 
judged relative to that of one's peers, the significant 
finding suggests that only depressed subjects did not demon-
strate a systemmatic optimistic bias in judging their sus-
ceptibility to health problems. In other words, the 
depressed subjects were, as hypothesized, more realistic in 
their appraisals of personal health risk. These data sup-
port the hypothesis that depression is associated with more 
realistic expectations and less self-enhancement in terms of 
illusions of control and/or invulnerability, as reported by 
Alloy and Abramson (1979), Layne (1983), Crocker, Kayne, and 
Alloy (1985), Krantz (1985), and Pyszczynski, Holt, and 
Greenberg (1987). 
In fact, the pattern of main effects for depression in 
association with the AEQ scales adds further support to the 
suggestion that higher levels of depression are associated 
with less illusion of personal invulnerability. The more 
depressed subjects in this study described themselves as 
significantly more affected by alcohol than did the less 
depressed subjects. As hypothesized, depression was signi-
ficantly associated with the expectation of a negative con-
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sequence of drinking, i.e. that of impairment (i= 2.05, 
~<.05). Again, this effect was self-referent, indicating 
that only more depressed subjects consistently internalized 
the potential vulnerability to some kind of harm from 
drinking. It is noteworthy, too, that the depressed sub-
jects' alcohol-related expectancies were not universally 
negative. More depressed subjects also anticipated signi-
ficantly more enhancement of sexual feelings (i= 1.99, 
~<.05) and social assertion (i= 2.03, ~<.05) as a conse-
quence of their drinking, and their expectations of relax-
ation (i= 1.95) approached significance as well. Thus 
depression did not serve to simply make subjects more 
pessimistic or negative in their perceptions; rather, the 
more depressed subjects described balanced expectations of 
both positive and negative consequences of drinking. In a 
sense, more depressed subjects demonstrated the capacity to 
see both sides of the coin, whereas less depressed subjects 
denied being much affected in any way by drinking. These 
data correspond to the findings of Eaves and Rush (1984), 
Krantz (1985), and Munoz and Lewinsohn (submitted for pub-
lication), all of whom noted that depression had less to do 
with weakened positive expectancies than with stronger neg-
ative expectancies. 
Holding simultaneous expectations of positive and 
negative consequences of one's drinking could conceivably be 
interpreted as indicative of disorganized or contradictory 
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beliefs, in line with Eaves and Rush's (1984) and Cook and 
Peterson's (1986) assertions that depression reflects illo-
gical thought processes. Such an interpretation, thou.gh, 
would be predicated on the assumption that either alcohol 
consumption does not have multiple effects, or that these 
effects are mutually exclusive of each other. Anyone who 
has had the occasion to drink a little too much would almost 
certainly refute these assumptions, since they have probably 
experienced both desirable and undesirable consequences of 
drinking. Less colloquially, the studies by Southwick et 
al. (1981), Rohsenow (1983), and Brown and Munson (1987) 
have demonstrated drinkers' simultaneous expectations of 
various effects from drinking. By contrast, it is intrin-
sically contradictory for alcoholics in treatment to des-
cribe themselves as less affected by alcohol than others, 
yet concurrently anticipate significantly more positive 
consequences of drinking: such beliefs clearly reflect a 
distorted and inconsistent view of reality. However, to 
acknowledge personal susceptibility to potential illness or 
injury, and to simultaneously allow for the possibility of 
experiencing both positive and negative effects from drink-
ing, is an entirely consistent and even-handed appraisal of 
one's vulnerability. The current findings thus suggest that 
a more realistic and less defensively biased appraisal is a 
function of the level of depression. 
Depression did not, however, show the hypothesized 
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relationship to death attitudes, even when attitudes toward 
personal death were differentiated from attitudes toward 
others' deaths. These data thus support the findings of 
Lucas (1974) and Wagner and Lorion (1984), both of whom 
reported a weak relationship between depression and death 
anxiety. In the context of this study, the lack of a sig-
nificant relationship between depression and evaluation of 
personal death, especially given the significant association 
between depression and evaluations of general health risk, 
suggests that death attitudes are not a logical extension of 
evaluations of personal vulnerability. It is almost as if 
the more depressed subjects were willing to acknowledge more 
concern or worry about potential illness or impairment, but 
not about their own deaths. The subjects in this study 
seemed to view death attitudes as unrelated to perceptions 
of personal health. Becker (1973) would view this distinc-
tion as indicative of the fundamental human need to isolate 
and deny the reality of one's own mortality. The pattern of 
results observed for the death attitude scales certainly 
coincide with Becker's (1973) position. Death attitude 
scores were highly consistent across groups, as were the 
significant self-other differences reported (cf. Table 4). 
Apparently the reality of personal death is remote, even for 
the less defensively biased depressed subjects. 
The one significant interaction identified also sug-
gests that depression is associated with less distortion of 
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reality. The degree of association between depression and 
perception of personal impairment from drinking differed 
significantly between the outpatient alcoholic and hyperten-
sive groups (~= 2.07, ~<.05). As predicted, the overall 
relationship between depression and perceptions of personal 
impairment was positive: subjects acknowledging more depres-
sion also acknowledged more potential self-harm associated 
with their behavior, consistent with the findings of Farba-
row (1980) and Sweeney, Anderson, and Bailey (1986). It is 
noteworthy, though, that contrary to the hypotheses, the 
outpatient alcoholics' perceptions of potential impairment 
from drinking were ~ independent of their depression 
scores, especially at lower levels of depression (Figures 1 
& 2). Several interpretations of these data are possible. 
Figures 1 and 2 show relatively more scatter in 
impairment scores at lower levels of depression. It is pos-
sible that the brevity of the impairment subscale, consis-
ting of only five items, created a ceiling effect. The 
overall distripution of impairment scores shows a preponder-
ance of high impairment scores, especially for alcoholic 
subjects, regardless of the level of depression. If a 
greater range of impairment scores were possible, there 
might have been a clearer trend in the way in which the 
alcoholic subjects' BDI and impairment scale scores covar-
ied. Relatedly, having relatively fewer subjects with high 
depression scores, especially in the hypertension group, 
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limits the confidence with which one can interpret the 
interaction of scores in the higher ranges. Thus the rela-
tively skewed distributions of scores, with generally high 
impairment scores and generally low BDI scores, may limit 
the meaningfulness of the interaction observed. 
This limitation of the data notwithstanding, it 
appears that alcoholics' expectations of alcohol-related 
impairment are less closely associated with their degree of 
depression than are such expectations of nonalcoholics. 
This could be a reflection of the poorer integration or 
ordination of constructs identified among substance abusers 
and more maladjusted people (Farbarow, 1980; Angellilo et 
al., 1985). If so, this would imply that denial involves 
the process more than the content of alcoholics' cognitions. 
Less depressed alcoholics seem to show less coherent organi-
zation of their experiences, rather than inaccurate percep-
tions per se (Alloy & Abramson, 1979; Farbarow, 1980). In 
fact, the interaction of scores among more depressed alco-
holics more closely resembled the pattern of scores among 
the more depressed nonalcoholics-- in other words, alcoholic 
subjects were more consistent and more like nonalcoholic 
subjects at moderate to high levels of depression. Experi-
encing moderate levels of depression, then, may be adaptive 
for alcoholic subjects, at least to the extent that it is 
associated with a more realistic and integrated organization 
of personal experience. This interpretation is consistent 
with Gibson and Becker's (1973a) report that the cognitive 
organization of depressed alcoholics paralleled that of 
depressed nonalcoholics, and the conclusion of numerous 
researchers that depression is associated with being less 
defensively biased regarding the possibility of negative 
personal experiences (Layne, 1983; Krantz, 1985; Crocker, 
Kayne, & Alloy, 1985). Again, though, given the skewed 
distribution of scores involved, some replication of this 
finding would prove valuable. 
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In point of fact, the effects of depression identified 
are particularly noteworthy given the positively skewed dis-
tribution of BDI scores (Table 1). In general, depression 
scores were relatively low, with outpatient alcoholic, 
aftercare, and hypertension group mean scores of, respec-
tively, 13.6, 11, and 9.3 (see Table 2). There was no sig-
nificant difference between the group means, although the 
two alcoholic groups had a broader range of scores, i.e. 
scores up to 36 and 32 for the outpatient and aftercare 
groups, compared to a high of 26 for the nonalcoholic group. 
The depression scores observed in the alcoholic subjects in 
this study are comparable to the mean BDI score of 13.8 
reported by Beck, Steer, and McElroy (1982) but are somewhat 
lower than those reported by Petty and Nasrullah (1981), who 
found scores above 18 for almost 40% of their sample. Also, 
Hesselbrock et al. (1983) reported that over half of their 
inpatient alcoholic sample had scores over 13 on the BDI. 
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The slightly higher BDI scores of alcoholic subjects begin-
ning treatment are consistent with the observations of Gib-
son and Becker (1973) and Petty and Nasrullah (1981), that 
depression levels tend to decrease across the course of 
treatment. Thus, the alcoholic subjects in this study 
reported fewer incidences of more severe depression than 
would be expected based on previous findings. 
It is possible that the more depressed alcoholic sub-
jects in treatment were underrepresented in this sample, 
because participation was strictly voluntary and involved a 
full half hour of completing measures. Cooperation required 
a fair amount of effort, even by the standards of less 
depressed individuals. The task involved may thus have sel-
ected against more depressed subjects (almost 30% refused to 
participate in the study). It is possible that with a ful-
ler distribution of depression scores, stronger main effects 
for depression would have been identified. However, even 
with the limitations of the BDI scores obtained, depression 
proved to be a significant intervening variable in alcoholic 
perceptions of personal risk. 
In sum, these data lend strong support to most of the 
hypotheses concerning depression. First, main effects for 
depression were observed only for self~referent measures, in 
support of the self-schema theories of depression (Beck et 
al., 1979; Lewinsohn et al., 1982; Segal & Shaw, 1986; Pysz-
czynski, Holt, & Greenberg, 1987). Secondly, the pattern of 
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main effects of depression indicated that depressed subjects 
acknowledged more vulnerability to illness and impairment, 
and to the effects of drinking, consistent with the hypothe-
sis that depression is associated with less illusion of con-
trol over the environment, as described by Alloy and Abram-
son (1979), Layne (1983), Krantz (1985), and Crocker, Kayne, 
and Alloy (1985). This hypothesis of depressive realism is 
further supported by the fact that the more depressed sub-
jects in this study were not strictly more negative or pes-
simistic, and by the observation that at higher levels of 
depression the cognitive organization of the alcoholic sub-
jects was more consistent and more like that of nonalco-
holic subjects. In general, the effects of depression were 
highly comparable across groups, although depression had to 
reach moderately high levels before it proved relevant for 
alcoholics' expectations of alcohol-related impairment. 
Taken together, these data suggest that a moderate level of 
depression is adaptive for an alcoholic, because it is asso-
ciated with a more consistent appraisal of personal vulnera-
bility than is evidenced by less depressed alcoholics. 
III. Evaluations of Personal Risk 
This study sought to relate the importance of self-
other distinctions in appraisals of health risk to a pop-
ulation engaging in the health-threatening behavior of 
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alcohol abuse (Farbarow, 1980; Perloff & Fetzer, 1986). It 
was hypothesized that all subjects would differentiate 
between personal and more general expectations of risk, and 
that depression would prove relevant only in terms of per-
sonal expectations. The data yielded strong support for 
these hypotheses. It was also hypothesized that alcoholic 
subjects would show greater self-other differences in their 
evaluations than would nonalcoholic subjects, but there was 
a failure to support this hypothesized interaction. 
As hypothesized, all subjects tended to minimize their 
concerns or perceptions of personal vulnerability to ill-
ness, impairment, or death relative to their perceptions of 
others' risks. This bias toward perceiving less-than-aver-
age risk did not reach significance in relation to views of 
general health problems, as measured by the Future Health 
Inventory (FHI). However, this bias was statistically sig-
nificant for all of the AEQ subscales, measuring expected 
consequences of alcohol consumption, and for the death atti-
tude scales. 
The consistency and relative strength of the self-
other differences in AEQ scores suggest a distinct bias spe-
cific to expectations of the effects of alcohol. Weinstein 
(1980, 1984) found that one of the strongest biases of 
undergraduate subjects was in terms of perceived invulnera-
bility to alcohol-related problems. In this case clinical 
subjects, including two groups of alcoholics in treatment, 
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still described themselves as less affected by alcohol than 
people in general, for every one of the AEQ subscales. 
Alcoholic and nonalcoholic drinkers alike have demonstrated 
a distinct tendency to perceive themselves as less influ-
enced by alcohol than others (Selzer et al., 1977; South-
wick et al., 1981; Rohsenow, 1983). Perloff and Fetzer's 
(1986) ''ego-defensive downward comparisons" theory can be 
used to interpret the strength of this bias in relation to 
alcohol. According to Perloff and Fetzer (1986), a person 
will, when given the opportunity, assess his own risk for a 
particular misfortune by selecting a more at-risk person as 
a basis for comparison. Typically, to the extent that this 
comparison target is not someone specific or close to one-
self, one is able to admit to the reality of negative events 
occurring, but lessen one's anxiety by focusing on others 
more at risk than oneself. Alcoholism lends itself to such 
stereotyping, and the image of a skid row bum clutching a 
bottle in a brown paper bag is a fairly popular and extreme 
stereotype that for most people would create a strong (and 
comfortable) perception of distance between themselves and 
the "typical" alcoholic. Such an unappealing image of the 
kind of person who is affected by their drinking would cer-
tainly be inconsistent with most people's self images and 
would thus reinforce minimizing personal vulnerability to 
alcohol consumption. 
Aside from the stigma associated with popular cultural 
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images of the alcoholic, there may also be a distinct phar-
macological effect of alcohol consumption that heightens 
self-other discrepencies in perceptions of vulnerability. 
Hull's (1981) self-awareness model of alcohol consumption 
posits that one action of alcohol on the brain is to disrupt 
the encoding of self-relevant information. In essence, 
drinking may reinforce a lack of internalization of experi-
ences involving alcohol use by interference, on a physio-
logical level, with the brain's ability to encode informa-
tion into coherent self-schema. Alcoholic subjects, then, 
may describe themselves as less affected by drinking than 
people in general because their ingestion of alcohol inhib-
ited internalization of their drinking experiences. 
The other area of significant self-other differences 
was in relation to attitudes toward death. As hypothesized, 
all subjects described significantly less concern or worry 
about their own deaths than the deaths of others. However, 
scores between groups were highly comparable, indicating 
that alcoholics did not show a greater discrepency in death 
attitudes than did nonalcoholics, contrary to the hypothe-
ses. Becker (1973) would conceptualize the lack of worry 
subjects expressed about personal death as a "normal" form 
of denial. He described "organismic narcissism" as the crux 
of the human condition: this narcissism is that no one 
believes that they themselves will die. According to Kier-
kegaard, the paradox of being part animal, part symbolic is 
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an awful and overwhelming apprehension for most people, who 
in turn respond by repressing their anxieties about their 
mortality and tranquilizing themselves with trivial preoccu-
pations (Becker, 1973). Anxiety is contained, but at the 
cost of distorted perceptions of reality and a more restric-
ted lifestyle. 
While the alcoholic subjects' minimalization of con-
cern regarding their own deaths was no more extreme, the 
associated distortion of reality could have more serious 
implications. As Becker (1973) observes, fear of death is 
adaptive, as it orients an individual toward self-preserva-
tion: "Early men who were most afraid •.. about their place 
in nature •.. passed on to their offspring a realism that had 
high survival value" (p. 17). Farbarow (1980) too notes 
that alcoholics, engaging in a form of indirect self-des-
tructive behavior, do not recognize their behavior as real-
istically resulting in self-injury. Farbarow (1980) sug-
gests that alcoholic risk-taking generates an unrealistic 
sense of power and control over the environment. Schwebal 
and Kaemmerer (1977) relate this same issue of control to 
smokers' general fatalism regarding having control over 
their deaths, and thus unrealistically perceiving the con-
sequences of smoking as more or less irrelevant in terms of 
their life expectancy. Thus the relative lack of concern 
expressed by all subjects over personal death may reflect an 
innate human tendency to deny, or at least minimize, the 
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anxiety and powerlessness felt in relation to personal mor-
tality. The significantly greater worry expressed for the 
deaths of loved ones would then reflect a stronger sense of 
reality about others' eventual deaths. 
The only measure not yielding a significant self-other 
difference in perception of risk was the FHI. A trend in 
the hypothesized direction was observed, but its failure to 
reach significance was probably due to the extreme variance 
in scores (SD= 16.59). It may also be a function of the 
directions given to the subjects to assess their risks rela-
tive to those of other men their age-- a fairly specific 
comparison target. While the FHI's comparison target was 
specifically a peer figure, the "other" version of the AEQ 
asked for an evaluation of the consequences of drinking for 
"people in general," thus allowing some latitude in terms of 
the comparison target chosen. Perloff and Fetzer's (1986) 
theory would predict greater self-other discrepencies under 
the less directive conditions of the AEQ instructions, as 
was the case in this instance, 
Only one significant group difference in degree of 
self-other discrepency was identified. The outpatient alco-
holic group showed significantly less self-other discrepency 
than the hypertensive comparison group in terms of expecta-
tion of alcohol-induced impairment (E= 3.37, p<.01). Con-
trary to the hypotheses, the outpatient alcoholics antici-
pated as much impairment from drinking as others, whereas 
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alcoholics in aftercare expected others to be somewhat more 
impaired, and hypertensive subjects expected others to be 
quite a bit more impaired. These results might reflect the 
immediacy of experiences with impairment from drinking: many 
outpatient alcoholics, beginning treatment, were probably 
involved in recent or ongoing problems associated with their 
drinking, whereas aftercare patients had several months of 
treatment behind them, and the nonabusive drinkers probably 
had had fewer experiences of alcohol-related impairment. 
Because the AA model of treatment specifically focuses first 
and foremost on admitting to be powerless over (i.e. vul-
nerable to) alcohol, participation in the treatment program 
may well diminish feelings of invulnerability. Alcohol 
abusers not in treatment might have shown a more pronounced 
bias in terms of perceived personal invulnerability. 
The general failure to find group differences in the 
degree of self-other discrepency may, then, be in part a 
function of the alcoholic subjects' participation in a 
treatment program that emphasizes personal vulnerability to 
the effects of alcohol. The comparability of the groups in 
terms of self-other death attitudes indicates that alcoholic 
subjects were not engaging in more extreme denial of nega-
tive views about their mortality. Perhaps there is no need 
for greater denial, if the substance abuse is perceived as 
irrelevant to ultimate mortality risk (Schwebal & Kaemmerer, 
1977; Farbarow, 1980). Or perhaps acknowledging vulnerabil-
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ity to alcohol modifies an alcoholic's broader sense of vul-
nerabilities, bringing his perceptions of his mortality more 
into line with the more "normal'' death attitudes of nonalco-
holics. 
This second suggestion fits the information processing 
framework described by Guidano and Liotti (1983), who empha-
size that one's self-concept is at the center of all know-
ledge, and any change in attitudes toward oneself necessar-
ily modifies one's attitude toward reality. In other words, 
self-knowledge is distinct from more general knowledge, yet 
the content and the organization of the self-concept direct 
how we interact with our environment, and how we assimilate 
our experiences. Thus if the self-concept is modified to 
incorporate the quality of I-can-be-affected-by-alcohol, 
then there will be some reorganization of related beliefs, 
attributions, and values that will in turn influence the 
behaviors that emerge as an extension of the new self-evalu-
ation. Now poor job performance can be attributed to. 
impairment from a hangover, so the pattern of drinking may 
change. Assimilation of these new experiences may in turn 
revise related beliefs, e.g. about how much control you have 
in your life, or on a deeper level your evaluation of the 
kind of person you are, either or both of which have impli-
cations for your attitudes toward your death. 
Overall, the consistency of the self-other discrepen-
cies and the lack of significant group differences in the 
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form or degree of these discrepencies suggest that seeing 
oneself as distinct from others is a very fundamental ten-
dency in human beings. Guidano and Liotti (1983) theorize 
that self-knowledge is processed in a qualitatively differ-
ent manner than general knowledge, and the results of this 
study and those of Kuiper and Rogers (1979) and Pyszczynski, 
Holt, and Greenberg (1987) support Guidano and Liotti's 
(1983) model. Similarly, Becker's (1973) description of the 
universal denial or minimalization of distress over personal 
mortality is supported by the current findings and receives 
some convergent validation from the finding that people con-
sistently differentiate between attitudes toward personal 
death and more general attitudes toward death (Durlak & Kas-
imatis, in press). Apparently it is inevitable that each 
person is the center of their experience, and the distinc-
tions they make between themselves and others profoundly 
affect their expectations, attributions, and other cogni-
tive processes that mediate their sense of reality. 
IV. Characteristic Cognitions of Alcoholics 
The pattern of main effects of group membership indi-
cate that alcoholics and nonalcoholics differed most in 
terms of their expectations of reinforcement from alcohol. 
The lack of any significant differences between the outpa-
tient and aftercare alcoholic groups suggests that regard-
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less of the point in treatment, the alcoholic subjects were 
still more like each other than like the nonalcoholic com-
parison group, a finding also reported by Woodruff et al. 
(1973b). This similarity is further supported by the numer-
ous effects for group membership identified in comparisons 
of each of the alcoholic groups with the hypertensive group 
(see Table 4). 
In terms of the specific hypotheses, there was a fail-
ure to support the hypothesized group differences in terms 
of evaluations of general health risks or personal death. 
All subjects showed some tendency to minimize their general 
health risks, but this tendency was not statistically signi-
ficant and was not, as hypothesized, more pronounced among 
alcoholic subjects. Similarly, while all subjects reported 
significantly fewer negative attitudes toward their own 
deaths than toward the deaths of others, there were no sig-
nificant differences between the groups themselves. Per-
haps, as was suggested before, the abuse of alcohol was not 
perceived by alcoholic subjects as having any particular 
ramifications in terms of their illness or mortality, and as 
such there was no need for a more extreme bias in percep-
tions of personal vulnerability. 
However, the data yielded fairly strong support for 
the hypothesized differences between alcoholic and nonalco-
holic subjects in terms of their expectations of the conse-
quences of alcohol consumption. Both alcoholic groups held 
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significantly more positive expectations of reinforcement 
from drinking, particularly for themselves but also to a 
lesser degree for others. Thus these differences were.not, 
as hypothesized, limited to personal expectations, although 
there were more significant differences in personal expec-
tancies than in general expectancies. Also, contrary to the 
hypotheses, the minimalization of the potential impairment 
from drinking referred to drinkers in general, rather than 
personal impairment. These results are consistent with the 
findings of Southwick et al. (1981), Rohsenow (1983), and 
Brown, Creamer, and Stetson (1987), all of whom reported 
that alcohol abusers are consistently more oriented toward 
the potential positive effects of drinking. In each of 
these studies, heavier drinkers differed from nonabusing 
drinkers in expecting significantly more positive conse-
quences from alcohol consumption, while not differing in 
expectations of negative consequences. Also, the relative 
strength of the alcoholics' expectancies support Brown, 
Goldman, and Christianson's (1985) and Brown and Munson's 
(1987) findings that stronger alcohol expectancies are asso-
ciated with heavier drinking, for alcoholic and nonalcoholic 
drinkers. 
In this study the alcoholic subjects evidenced a some-
what contradictory but stronger bias in reference to percep-
tions of alcohol consumption than did the nonalcoholic com-
parison group. All subjects evaluated themselves as less 
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affected by alcohol than others, but the alcoholic subjects 
simultaneously held significantly stronger expectations of 
positive reinforcement from drinking, moreso for themselves 
but also for others. And, despite the fact that most of the 
alcoholic subjects had certainly experienced some kind of 
alcohol-related problems or impairment in recent months, 
they still did not differ from the nonalcoholic subjects in 
their anticipation of the potential negative consequences of 
drinking, and even described significantly less impairment 
associated with drinking in general. 
It is interesting that the support for the hypothe-
sized bias was circumscribed to expectations of reinforce-
ment from alcohol in particular, and did not generalize to 
broader concerns about health and mortality. In a sense, 
alcoholics were no different from nonalcoholics except in 
terms of their perceptions of the effects of alcohol itself. 
Their expectations about alcohol were more powerful and more 
inconsistent. The cognitive differences noted could be 
interpreted as a function of the characteristics of alcohol-
ics in particular, or the characteristics of a broader popu-
lation of addicted or maladjusted people. 
Alcoholics characteristically find feelings of vulner-
ability to be ego-dystonic, according to Farbarow (1980). 
Traits of dependency and anxiety, and issues of control are 
commonly identified as part of the "alcoholic personality," 
and are clearly relevant to perceptions of vulnerability and 
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to the problems of depression and low self-esteem so fre-
quently observed in alcoholics (Weissman et al., 1977; Far-
barow, 1980; Brown & Munson, 1987; Holden, 1987). The· data 
reflect the types of reinforcements anticipated by the alco-
holic subjects: to feel more powerful and assertive, more 
relaxed and comfortable. All suggest a possible constella-
tion of issues and feelings related to vulnerability and 
control that could be considered "typically alcoholic." 
The current data suggest that these control issues 
tend to be highly focused, almost exclusively, on control in 
relation to alcohol use. Perhaps the alcoholic's preoccupa-
tion with the control over drinking is a metaphor for (and 
distraction from) concerns about control or efficacy in 
other areas of his life. Worrying about how much and how 
well you can drink would be, in Becker's (1973) framework, a 
trivial and literally tranquilizing distraction from more 
overwhelming anxiety about the limited control that you have 
over your life and death. Alcohol's actual pharmacological 
effects may also reinforce drinking as a response to anxiety 
and feelings of vulnerability by influencing how information 
regarding personal experiences with alcohol is encoded and 
assimilated (Hull, 1986). Smart (1968) even suggests that 
alcohol use seems to diminish the coherence of ordering of 
personal future time perspective in alcoholics. In other 
words, the effect of alcohol on the brain seems to contri-
bute to the development of contradictory expectations of the 
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consequences of personal alcohol use, both in reference to 
the present and the future. 
Thus the group differences observed can be interpreted 
as a function of personality dynamics characteristic of 
alcoholics, reinforced by the pharmacological action of 
alcohol. However, while the "alcoholic" traits discussed 
previously can be plausibly related to perceptions of vul-
nerability and cognitive disorganization, most are not 
exclusive to the disorder of alcoholism. Depression, anxi-
ety, and low self-esteem are also symptommatic of a number 
of other psychological disorders and have been shown to 
adversely affect cognitive consistency and feelings of con-
trol or power (Beck, 1967; McAllister, 1981; Martin, Ward & 
Clark, 1983; Eaves & Rush, 1984; Cook & Peterson, 1986). 
The distortion or incoherence of the alcoholic subjects' 
expectations of reinforcement from alcohol may not be unique 
to alcoholism per se, so much as the broader dynamics of 
either addiction or general maladjustment. 
The hypotheses regarding the main effects of alcohol-
ism in this study were based on the results of studies not 
only of alcoholics, but of smokers and drug abusers as well. 
The results of this study could alternately be interpreted 
in the context of an addictive, rather than an alcoholic, 
personality. The logic of Fishbein's (1977) model of inter-
nalization of risk, based on his literature review of smo-
kers' beliefs, certainly seems applicable to the interpre-
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tation of results from studies of alcohol abuse, such as 
those of Rohsenow (1983) or Brown, Creamer, & Stetson 
(1987). In fact, Marlatt's (1978) "abstinence violati~n 
effect" concept, again developed to describe relapses in 
smoking cessation, has been employed by Cooney et al. (1987) 
to explain cognitive and affective changes in alcoholic and 
nonalcoholic drinkers. And Eiser and Harding (1983) found 
that beliefs about smoking were differentially related to 
beliefs about drinking. Patterns of beliefs about substance 
abuse seem to cut across the specific form of addiction. 
The relative inconsistency of the alcoholic's expecta-
tions can also be understood as a function of general malad-
justment. The alcoholic subjects had not meaningfully inte-
grated their beliefs: their perceptions of how they were 
affected by alcohol were contradictory, and apparently iso-
lated from what would logically be related areas of concern, 
i.e. general health and mortality risk. In a sense, the 
alcoholics' beliefs about their alcohol abuse comprised an 
encapsulated area of cognitive disorganization. Angellilo 
et al. (1985) found low ordination or organization of con-
structs to be a correlate of general psychological maladap-
tion, regardless of the particular type of pathology mani-
fested. It was the degree of organization of constructs, 
rather than their actual content, that distinguished psychi-
atric subjects from the normal controls (Angellilo et al., 
1985). 
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Similarly, Guidano and Liotti's (1983) model of cogni-
tive processes posits that emotional disorders are associ-
ated with the distortion and lack of assimilation of real-
ity. Guidano and Liotti (1983) suggest that our behavior is 
organized around our need to confirm and maintain a stable 
sense of personal identity. To the extent that a person's 
self-image is contradictory or threatened by disconfirming 
experiences that threaten self-esteem, a ''protective belt" 
or defensive shell excludes or distorts the new information 
in an attempt to preserve a stable sense of self (and thus 
reality). As a result, experiences are not coherently 
assimilated, and the individual's interaction with reality 
becomes increasingly rigid and stereotypic in order to pro-
tect the threatened self-concept. For this study, then, the 
alcoholics' contradictory evaluation of personal vulnerabil-
ity to alcohol could be expected to stimulate a defensive 
response to experiences that challenge perceptions of invul-
nerability, resulting in both a less coherent organization 
of expectations, and behaviors reflecting more distorted and 
defensive attitudes toward reality. 
In summary, then, there was mixed support for the 
hypothesized group effects. The two alcoholic groups were 
found to be quite similar to each other, and each demonstra-
ted significant cognitive differences in comparison to the 
nonalcoholic group. Contrary to the hypotheses, alcoholic 
subjects did not differ from nonalcoholic subjects in atti-
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tudes toward general health or death, although they did have 
significantly different expectations of reinforcement from 
alcohol. While these main effects were not, as hypothe-
sized, limited only to personal experience, there were more 
significant differences in personal, rather than general, 
expectations. Overall, alcoholic subjects held signifi-
cantly more positive expectations regarding personal alco-
hol consumption, and more positive and less negative per-
ceptions of drinking in general. Given their concurrent 
perception of being less affected by alcohol than are 
others, the alcoholics demonstrated a somewhat inconsistent 
and disorganized set of cognitions related to their alcohol 
abuse. Without a psychiatric control group, this cognitive 
disorganization could be variously interpreted as charac-
teristic of alcoholism, addiction, or general maladjustment. 
V. Summary and Conclusions 
The purpose of this study was to examine alcoholics' 
perceptions of the consequences of their alcohol abuse-- in 
particular, their subjective appraisals of risk of illness, 
impairment, and death. It was hypothesized that all sub-
jects would describe significantly different evaluations of 
personal vulnerability, depending upon their degree of 
depression, and that the differences among alcoholics would 
be more extreme than those of nonalcoholics. Denial was 
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conceptualized as a failure to meaningfully incorporate, as 
personally relevant, more general knowledge of the potential 
risks associated with one's behavior. In contrast, the cog-
nitive aspect of depression emphasized involved the more 
negative but realistic appraisal of personal vulnerability 
to misfortune. The outcome of this study was consistent 
with most of these formulations. 
Most notably, what emerged was a type of counterpoint 
between denial and depression. As hypothesized, the two 
showed an antagonistic relationship in reference to percep-
tions of personal vulnerability. Higher levels of depres-
sion were significantly associated with acknowledging more 
vulnerability to general health risks, and to the effects 
(both positive and negative) of alcohol consumption. Thus 
the depressed subjects demonstrated a somewhat more negative 
but generally more balanced and integrated self-assessment, 
which in turn implies a less distorted view of reality. It 
should be noted, however, that this trend was evidenced 
across low-to-moderate levels of depression, and as such 
cannot necessarily be extrapolated to more severely 
depressed subjects. 
Another clear pattern that emerged was that of the 
seemingly innate tendency to differentiate between evalua-
tions of oneself and of others. All subjects consistently 
minimized their concerns about themselves relative to the 
risks they perceived for others. Subjects were more nega-
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tive in their evaluations of others' deaths, and others' 
susceptibility to the effects of alcohol. These differences 
do suggest that humans are inherently self-centered: not 
only are self-schema the reference point for each person's 
construction of reality, but they are "normally" biased 
toward self-evaluations of being uniquely lucky or invulner-
able. Depression, again at less severe levels, appears to 
involve not so much a pathological pessimism as a loss of 
potentially pathological optimism. 
Why qualify optimism as "potentially" pathological? 
There are indications that some denial of worry can be adap-
tive. Some optimistic bias in personal expectancies may 
sustain motivation for problem-solving (Weinstein, 1982; 
Layne, 1983; Segal & Shaw, 1984). Denial of anxiety before 
serious operations is associated with fewer post-operative 
complications and speedier discharge (Goleman, 1987). There 
is, however, an obvious caveat: while self-deception may be 
adaptive in situations in which you cannot change the threat 
at hand, it is clearly maladaptive if it results in not res-
ponding to important symptoms or cues of manageable risks 
(Weinstein, 1982; Goleman, 1987). In the context of this 
study, the consistency with which less depressed subjects 
described themselves as less affected by alcohol than others 
is remarkable, particularly since two-thirds of the subjects 
were in treatment for alcohol abuse. Considering that the 
cognitive organization of the more depressed alcoholics more 
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closely resembled that of the nonalcoholic subjects, it is 
not surprising that Holden (1987) reports that a diagnosis 
of depression in an alcoholic patient is associated with 
improved benefit from treatment. Alcoholics appear to be 
better served by a little depression than a little denial. 
Thus it does seem to be useful to consider alcoholics 
as a heterogeneous population, and to consider depression as 
one meaningful parameter for distinguishing subgroups (Sel-
zer, Winokur, & Wilson, 1977; Holden, 1987). In this study, 
more depressed subjects' self-evaluations were significantly 
different from those of less depressed subjects. In con-
trast, no significant differences were found between alco-
holics beginning and ending treatment-- a somewhat discour-
aging finding as far as the impact of the program. There 
was no evidence that the treatment program, based on widely 
accepted A.A. principles, had significantly changed the 
alcoholics' perceptions of personal vulnerability or their 
expectations of reinforcement from alcohol. There was also 
a failure to demonstrate the hypothesized interaction 
between alcoholism and depression. While there were a 
number of simple group differences between alcoholic and 
nonalcoholic subjects, these did not significantly interact 
with level of depression as predicted. Alcoholic subjects' 
biases, positive and negative, were not more extreme, and in 
one instance were significantly less distinct than those of 
nonalcoholic subjects. Depression was, in a sense, the 
great equalizer, having approximately the same effect for 
each group and lessening the differences between groups. 
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The one other area of unsupported hypotheses in ·this 
study was that of the death attitudes. Attitudes toward 
death, whether personal or of others, were originally con-
ceptualized as logical extensions of appraisals of risk of 
illness and impairment. This did not prove to be the case. 
The hypothesized significant self-other difference was 
found, but otherwise death attitude scores were consistent 
across groups and levels of depression. Death attitudes 
appear to be independent, if not encapsulated, from per-
ceived risks of illness or impairment. Even depressed sub-
jects, who acknowledged more personal vulnerability, did not 
seem to include death along a continuum of potential harm. 
Becker (1973) may be right: mortality may hold a uniquely 
isolated and defended position in the human psyche. 
What are the implications of these data for treatment? 
It may be necessary to induce, or at least not counter, a 
moderate level of depression in an alcoholic patient. Mod-
erate depression may be indicative of less denial and more 
internalization of the real consequences of alcohol abuse. 
Rather than aiming interventions at lessening depression, it 
may be a more therapeutic strategy to work at tolerating 
depression and anxiety-- in essence, an ego-strengthening 
approach. Since alcoholics' time perspectives are hazy, and 
the reality of potential self-destruction seems remote, an 
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emphasis on long range consequences may be less effective 
(Smart, 1968). Instead, what would be indicated would be a 
focus on integration of perceptions of the more immediate 
personal consequences of alcohol abuse, which would, in 
turn, require modification of the alcoholic patient's con-
tradictory self-image in reference to issues of vulnerabil-
ity and control. These two levels of intervention could be 
conceptualized as Guidano and Liotti's (1983) levels of per-
ipheral and deep change. 
The prevailing model for intervention, Alcoholics 
Anonymous, is not entirely inconsistent with these formula-
tions. A.A. emphasizes personal vulnerability, both in its 
"first step" (i.e. admitting powerlessness over alcohol) and 
in its requirement of introducing oneself as an alcoholic 
("I'm Mike and I'm an alcoholic"), A.A.'s concept of "hit-
ting bottom" endorses the potential value of experiencing 
depression. The "one day at a time" slogan is a validation 
of the depressive's world view that life is hard. Clearly, 
though, A.A. is not a miracle cure. While recidivism rates 
are difficult to establish, conservative estimates place 
attrition from treatment at over 50% (Holden, 1987). In 
this study, the lack of significant differences in the cog-
nitions of alcoholics beginning and completing treatment 
raises a serious question as to whether any significant cog-
nitive change had taken place. And even when A.A. interven-
tions prove successful, it is often not without costs. A.A. 
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fosters a certain amount of social segregation and a contin-
ued, albeit modified, preoccupation with alcohol. A.A. also 
requires more or less unquestioning adherence to its ideo-
logy, and is thus often antagonistic to more psychologically 
minded approaches to treatment. 
Probably A.A.'s main weakness is its view that there 
is one kind of alcoholism and one form of treatment for it. 
While there is not yet a great deal of information on the 
role of cognitions in substance abuse, there is a growing 
recognition of the potential value of cognitive interven-
tions in tailoring treatment to particular patient charac-
teristics (Gossop, Eiser, & Ward, 1982; Cooney et al., 1987; 
Curry, Marlatt, & Gordon, 1987; Holden, 1987). Pre-exist-
ing health beliefs have been shown to influence reponsive-
ness to different modalities of treatment for smokers (Eiser 
et al., 1985; Kaufert et al., 1986). Controlled drinking 
may be a viable goal for some but not all alcoholics (Hol-
den, 1987; Rychtarik et al., 1987). 
While such a treatment goal is incompatible with the 
A.A. model of alcoholism, other psychological interventions 
could prove to be useful supplements to (or replacements 
for) A.A.'s methods. Cognitive restructuring techniques 
could be employed to promote a more differentiated and inte-
grated self-concept of being strong yet not invulnerable. 
Role-playing and other problem-solving techniques would con-
tribute further to ego-strengthening (Curry, Marlatt, & Gor-
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don, 1987). Cognitive rehearsal is being targeted for 
relapse prevention (Cooney et al., 1987). The trend is 
toward recognizing the heterogeneity of substance abusers, 
and identifying the distinct patient needs or characteris-
tics that will predict benefit from a particular treatment 
modality. The results of this study suggest that level of 
depression and expectations regarding the consequences of 
drinking are characteristics that warrent further study. 
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Please remember that your answers are confidential and in no way affect your 
treatment eliiibility. We are interested in the general characteristics of 
the entire ~of research subjects. 
Year of Birth: 
Race: __ Black __ Caucasian __ Hispanic __ Native .\merican __ Other 
Marital Status:_Single _~Iarried _Separated _Widoi.;ed _Divorced 
Educational Status: (circle one number) 
Years of high school completed: l 2 3 4 
Years of college completed: 2 3 4 
Do you have a completed graduate degree? Yes No 
Employment Status: working fulltime -__ working part time __ retired 
__ unemployed or layed off 
What kind of work do you do? 
Job Title: ________________ _ 
Financial Status:(current annual net income) __ 0-10,000 __ 11-20,000 
__ 21-30,000 __ 31-40,000 __ more than 40,000 
Health Status: Do you have hypertension (high blood pressure)? _Yes _No 
Are you (or have you ever been) in treatment for hypertension? __ Yes __ No 
List any medication you are taking for hypertension: 
Do you have an alcohol abuse problem? __ Yes __ No 
Are you lor have you ever been) in treatment for alcoholism? __ Yes __ No 
Are you in treatment for alcoholism because of a court order? __ Yes __ No 
List any medications you are taking as part of treatment for alcoholism: 
Do you have any other health problems? __ Yes __ No 
If so, please list: 
List any other prescription medications you take: 
To what extent has your lifestyle changed in the last year: 









Listed below are a number of statements concerning personal attitudes and 
traits. Read each item and decide whether the statement is true or false as 














It is sometimes hard for me to go on with my work if I am 
not encouraged. 
I sometimes feel resentful when I don't get my way. 
On a fe~ occas1ons, I have given up doing something because 
I thought too littie of my ability. 
There have been times when I felt like rebelling against 
people in authority even though I knew they were right. 
No matter who I'm talking to, I'm always a 1ood listener. 
There have been occasions when I took advanta1e of someone. 
I'm always willing to admit it when I make a mistake. 
I sometimes try to get even rather than for1ive and foraet. 
I am always courteous, even to people who are disaareeable. 
I have never been an1ry when people expresaed ideas very 
different from my own. 
There have been times when I have been quite jealous of the 
1ood fortune of others. 
I am sometimes irritated by people who ask favors of me. 
I have never deliberately said somethina that hurt someone's 
feelin1s. 
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Interest and Preference Test 
Each of the items below contains two choices, A and B. Please circle the 
letter of the choice that most describes your likes or the way you feel. In 
some cases you may find items in which both choices describe your likes and 
feelings. Please choose the one which better describes your likes and 
feelings. If you do not like either choice, mark the choice you dislike 
least. Select only one choice, and do not leave any items blank. ~e are 
interested only in your likes or feelings, not in how others feel about 
these things or how one is supposed to feel. There are no right or wron~ 
answers. Be frank and give your honest appraisal of yourself. 
1. A. I like wild "un1nhib1 ted" parties. 
B. I prefer quiet parties ~ith good conversation. 
2. A. There are some mo\ies that I enjoy seeing a second or even a third 
time. 
B. I can't stand watching a movie that I've seen before. 
3. A. I often wish I could be a mountain climber. 
B. I can't understand people who risk their necks climbing mountains. 
4. A. I dislike all body odors. 
B. I like some of the earthy body smells. 
5. A. I aet bored seeing the same old faces. 
B. I like the comfortable familiarity of everyday friends. 
6. A. I like to explore a stranae city or section of town myself, even if 
it means getting lost. 
B. I prefer a guide when I am in a place I don't know well. 
7. A. I dislike people who do or say things just to shock or upset others. 
B. When you can predict almost everything a person will do and say, he 
or she must be a bore. 
8. A. I usually don't enjoy a movie or a play where I can predict what will 
happen in advance. 
B. I don't mind watching a movie or play where I can predict what will 
happen in advance. 
9. A. I have tried marijuana or would like to. 
B. I would never saoke marijuana. 
10. A. I would not like to try any drug which might produce strange and 
dangerous effects on me. 
B. I would like to try some of the new drugs that produce hallucina-
tions. 
11. A. A sensible person avoids activities that are danaerous. 
B. I sometimes like to do thinis that are a little friahtening. 
12. A. I dislike "swinaers". 
B. I enjoy the company of real "swingers", 
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13. A. I find that stimulants make me uncomfortable. 
B. I often like to get high (drinking liquor or smoking marijuana). 
14. A. I order the dishes "'ith which I am familiar, so as to avoid dis-
appointment and unpleasantness. 
B. I like to try new foods that I have never tasted before. 
15. A. I enjoy looking at home movies or travel slides. 
16. 
l i. 
B. Looking at someone's home movies or travel slides bpres me tremen-
dously. 
A. I would like to take up the sport of "'ater skiing. 
B. I would not like to take U!J i..-ater skiing. 
A. I would like to t ,.,. J ... • • surfboard riding. 
B. I would not like to try surfboard riding. 
18. A. When I go on a trip I like to plan my route and timetable fairly 
carefully. 
B. I would like to take off on a trip with no preplanned or definite 
routes or timetables. 
19. A. I prefer the "down to earth" kinds of people as friends. 
B. I would like to make friends in some of the "far out" groups like 
artists or "hippies". 
20. A. I would not like to learn to fly an airplane. 
B. I would like to learn to fly an airplane. 
21. A. I prefer the surface of the water to the depths. 
B. I would like to go scuba diving. 
22. A. I would like to meet some persons who are homosexual (men or women). 
B. I stay away from anyone I suspect of being "queer". 
23. A. I would like to try parachute jumping. 
B. I would never want to try jumping out of a plane, with or without 
a parachute. 
24. A. I prefer friends who are excitingly unpredictable. 
B. I prefer friends who are reliable and predictable. 
25. A. I am not interested in experience for its own sake. 
B. I like to have new and exciting experiences and sensations, even 
if they are a little frightening, unconventional or illegal. 
26. A. The essence of good art is in its clarity, sy1111111etry of form, and 
harmony of colors. 
B. I often find beauty in the "clashing" colors and irregular form 
of modern paintings. 
27. A. I enjoy spending time in the familiar surroundings of home. 
B. I get very restless if I have to stay around home for any length of 
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time. 
28. A. I like to dive off the high board. 
29. 
30. 
B. I don't like the feeling I get standing on the high board (or I don't 
go near it at all). 
A. I like to date members of the opposite sex who are physically 
exciting. 
B. I like to date members of the opposite sex who share my values. 
A. Heavy drinking usually ruins a party because some people get loud ar.d 
boisterous. 
B. Keeping the drinks full is the key to a good party. 
31. A. The worst social sin is to be rude. 
B. The worst social sin is to be a bore. 
























Even if I had the money I would not care to associate with flighty 
rich persons like those in the "jet set". 
I could conceive of myself seeking pleasures around the world with 
the "jet set". 
I like people who are sharp and witty even if they do sometimes 
insult others. 
I dislike people who have their fun at the expense of hurting the 
feelings of others. 
There is altogether too much portrayal of sex in movies. 
I enjoy watching many of the "sexy" scenes in movies. 
I feel best after taking a couple of drinks. 
Something is wrona with people who need liquor to feel good. 
People should dress according to some standard of taste, neatness, 
and style. 
People should dress in individual ways even if the effects are some-
times strange. 
Sail ins lona distances in small sailing crafts is foolish. 
I would like to sail a long distance in a small but seaworthy sailing 
craft. 
I have no patience with dull or boring persons. 
I find something interesting in almost every person I talk to. 
40. A. Skiing down a high mountain slope is a good way to end up on 
crutches. 




Please answer the following questions by circling yes or no. 
1. Do you feel you are a normal drinker? !By normal we mean you drink less 
than or as much as most other people.) Yes No 
2. Does your wife, husband, a parent, or other near relative ever worry or 
complain about your drinking? Yes No 
3. Do you ever feel guilty about your drinking? Yes No 
4. Do friends or relatives think you are a normal drinker? Yes ~o 
5. Are you able to stop drinking when you want to? Yes No 
6. Have you ever attended a meeting _of Alcoholics Anonymous? Yes No 
7. Has drinking ever created problems between you and your wife, husband, 
a parent or other near relative? Yes No 
8. Have you ever gotten into trouble at work because of drinking? Yes No 
9. Have you ever neglected your obligations, your faailYt or your work for 
two or more days in a row because you were drinkin1? Yes No 
10. Have you ever gone to anyone for help about your drinkin1? Yes No 
11. Have you ever been in a hospital because of drinkin1? Yes No 
12. Have you ever been arrested for drunken drivinl, drivinl while intoxi-
cated, or driving under the influence of alcoholic bevera1ea? Yes No 
13. Have you ever been arrested, even for a few hours, because of other 
drunken behavior? Yes No 
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BDI 
On this questionnaire are groups of statements. Please read the entire group 
of statements in each category. Then pick out the one statement in that 
group which best describes the way you feel today, that is, right now! On 
the answer sheet, circle the number corresponding to the statement you have 
chosen. If several statements in the group seem to apply equally as well, 
circle each one. 









0 I do not feel sad 
1 I feel sad 
2 I am sad all the time and can't seem to snap out of it 
3 I am so sad or unhappy that I can't stand it 
0 I am not particularly discouraged about the future 
1 I feel discouraged about the future 
2 I feel I have nothing to look forward to 
3 I feel that the future is hopeless and that thin1s cannot improve 
0 I do not feel like a failure 
1 I feel I have failed more than .the avera1e person 
2 As I look back on my life all I can see is a lot of failures 
3 I feel I am a complete failure as a person 
0 I get as much satisfaction out of thin1s as I used to 
1 I don't enjoy thin1s the way I used to 
2 I don't get real satisfaction out of anythinl anymore 
3 I am dissatisfied or bored with everythinl 
0 I don't feel particularly 1uilty 
1 I feel guilty a good part of the time 
2 I feel quite 1uilty most of the time 
3 I feel 1uilty all of the time 
0 I don't feel I am beinl punished 
1 I feel I may be punished 
2 I expect to be punished 
3 I feel I am being punished 
0 I don't feel disappointed in myself 
1 I am disappointed with myself 










3 I hate myself 
0 I don't feel I am any worse than anybody else 
1 I am critical of myself for my weaknesses or mistakes 
2 I blame myself all the time for my faults 
3 I blame myself for everything bad that happens 
0 I don't have any tho1ights of killing myself 
1 I have thoughts of killing myself, but would not carry them out 
2 I would like to kill myself 
3 I would kill myself if I had the chance 
O I don't cry any more than usual 
1 I cry more now than I used to 
2 I cry all the time now 
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am no more irritated now than I ever am 
get annoyed or irritated more easily than I used to 
feel irritated all the time now 
don't get irritated at all by the things that used to irritate me 
have not lost interest in other people 
am less interested in other people than I used to be 
have lost most of my interest in other people 
have lost all my interest in other people 
make decisions about as well as I ever could 
put .off making decisions more than I used to 
have greater difficulty in making decisions than before 
can't make decisions at all any more 
0 I don't feel I look any worse than I used to 
1 I am worried that I am looking old or unattractive 
2 I feel that there are permanent changes in my appearance that make me 
look unattractive 
3 I believe that I look ugly 
0 I can work about as well as before 
1 It takes extra effort to get started at doing something 
2 I have to push myself very hard to do anything 
3 I can't do any work at all 
0 I can sleep as well as usual 







2 I wake up 1-2 hours earlier than usual and find it hard to get.back to 
sleep 
3 I wake up several hours earlier than I used to and cannot get back to 
sleep 
0 I don't get anymore tired than usual 
1 I get tired more easily than I used to 
2 I get tired from doing almost anything 
3 I am too tired to do anything 
0 ~y appetite is no worse than usual 
1 My appetite is not as good as it used to be 
2 My appetite is much ~orse now 
3 I have no appetite at all any more 
0 I haven't lost much weight, if any, lately 
1 I have lost more than 5 pounds 
2 I have lost more than 10 pounds 
3 I have lost more than 15 pounds 
0 I am no more worried about my health than usual 
1 I am worried about physical problems such as aches and pains, upaet 
stomach, or constipation 
2 I am very worried about physical problems and it's hard to think of 
much else 
3 I am so worried about my physical problems, I cannot think about 
anything else 
0 I have not noticed any chanse in my interest in sex 
1 I am much less interested in sex than I used to be 
2 I am much less interested in sex now 




We want you to consider some of the various health problems that could 
happen to you at some time in the future. We want you to think about your 
chances and how they compare with the chances of other men your age. ~e 
don't want to know if you think it's likely or unlikely, but whether your 
own risk seems greater than, less than, or about the same as other men's 
risks. For each health problem, circle one number in the same row that 
estimates your chances ccmpared to your peers. 
Compared to other men your age. how likely are you to experience each of 




slightly average slightly much 




hardenini of arteries -3 
suicide attempt -3 
liver disease -3 
heart attack -3 
lun1 cancer -3 
ulcers -3 
mi1raine headaches -3 
asthma -3 
fatal auto accident -3 
kidney disease -3 
stroke -3 
strep throat -3 
40 lbs. overweight -3 
1um disease -3 
3verage average my age average average 
-2 -1 0 
-2 -1 0 
-2 -1 0 
-2 -1 0 
-2 -1 0 
-2 -1 0 
-2 -1 0 
-2 -1 0 
-2 -1 0 
-2 -1 0 
-2 -1 0 
-2 -1 0 
-2 -1 0 
-2 -1 0 
-2 -1 0 





















































These questions are designed to assess your personal feelings about death 
and dying. Read each statement and decide how you feel about the item. Then 
indicate the strength of "our agreement or disagreement, using the scale 
provided. Cnless otherwise indicated, consider the death in each question to 





















1. I would experience a great loss if someone close to me died. 
2. I would never get over the death of someone close to me. 
3. If someone close to me died, I ~ould miss him (or herl very much. 
4. I could not accept the finality of the death of a friend. 
5. I would easily adjust after the death of someone close to me. 
6. I would not mind having to identify the corpse of someone I knew. 















1. The pr9spect of my own death arouses anxiety in me. 
2. The prospect of my own death depresses me. 
3. I envision my own death as a painful, ni1htmarish experience. 
4. I am afraid of dying. 
5. I am afraid of beinl dead. 
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AEQ-SELF 
We would like to find out what you personally experience after you have had 
a few alcoholic drinks. For the following possible experiences, if an item 
is always or sometimes true for you, circle true. If the item is rarely or 
never true for you, circle false. Please answer every question without 
skipping any. 
1. Alcohol makes me feel flushed. 
2. Alcohol decreases muscular tensi~n in my body. 
3. I'm more clumsy after a fe~ drinks. 
~. I am more romantic when I drink. 
5. Drinking makes the future seem brighter to me. 
6. If I have had a couple of drinks it is easier for 
me to tell someone off. 
7. I can't act as quickly when I've been drinkin1. 
8. Alcohol can act as an anesthetic for me, that is, 
it can deaden pain. 
9. I often feel sexier after I've had a few drinks. 
10. Drinking makes me feel good. 
11. Alcohol makes me careless about my actions. 
12. Some alcohol has a pleasant, cleansin1, tinily 
taste to me. 
13. Drinkinl increases my ag1ressiveness. 















15. Alcohol makes it hard for me to concentrate. True 
16. I'm a better lover after a few drinks. True 
17. When I am drinking, it is easier to open up and 
express my feelings. True 
18. Drinking adds a certain warmth to social occasions 
for me. True 
19. I can't think as quickly after I drink. True 




















celebrate special occasions. 
21. Alcohol makes me worry less. 
22. Drinkinl makes me inefficient. 
23. Drinking is pleasurable because it's a way for me 
to join in with people ~ho are enjoying themselves. 
24. After a few drinks, I am ffi•)l'P. st-xually responsive. 
25. I feel more coordinat~1 af~er I drink. 
26. I'm more likely to sa• ~mbara3stng things after 
drinking. 
27. I enjoy having sex more if r·~e had some alcohol. 
28. Alcohol makes me less concerned about doing thin1s 
well. 
29. Alcohol helps me sleep better. 
30. Drinkinl 1ives me more confidence in myself. 
31. Alcohol makes me more irresponsible. 
32. After a few drinks it is easier for me to pick 
a fight. 
33. A few drinks make it easier for me to talk to 
people. 
34. If I have a couple of drinks it is easier to 
express my feelings. 




















We would like to find out what you think people in seneral experience after 
they have had a few alcoholic drinks. For the following possible 
experiences, if an item is always or sometimes true, circle true. If the 
item is rarely or never true, circle false. Please answer every question 
~ithout skipping any. 
1. Drinking makes people feel flushed. 
2. Alcohol decreases muscular tension. 
3. People are more clumsy after a few drinks. 
~. People are more romantic when they drink. 
5. Drinking makes the future seem brighter. 
6. If someone has had a couple of drinks it is 
easier for them to tell someone off, 
7. People can't act as quickly when they've been 
drinking. 
8. Alcohol can act as an anesthetic, that is, it 
can deaden pain. 











10. Drinking makes people feel good. True 
11. Alcohol makes people careless about their actions. True 
12. Some alcohol has a pleasant, cleansing, tingly 
taste. 
13. Drinking increases aggressiveness. 
14. Alcohol seems like magic. 
15. Alcohol makes it hard to concentrate. 
16. People are better lovers after a few drinks. 
17. When people are drinking, it is easier for them 







18. Drinking adds a certain warmth to social occasions. True 
19. People can't think as quickly after they drink. True 




















celebrate special occasions. 
21. Alcohol makes people worry less. 
22. Drinking makes one inefficient. 
23. Drinking is pleasurable because it's a wa) to 
join in with people ~he tr~ enjoying themselves. 
24. After a few drinks, P"'<)f:L~ are more sexual!~· 
responsive. 
25. People feel more coorJ~n~ted aft~r they drink. 
26. People are more likely ,, say ,;>mbarassing things 
after drinking. 
27. People enjoy having sex more 1f they've had some 
alcohol. 
28. Alcohol makes one less concerned about doing 
thinss right. 











30. Drinkins sives people more confidence in themselves.True 
31. Alcohol makes one more irresponsible. 
32. After a few drinks it is easier to pick a fight. 
33. A few drinks make it easier to talk to people. 
34. If people have a couple of drinks it is easier 
to express their feelings, 


























The Future Health Inventory (FHI) and the short form 
of the Alcohol Effects Questionnaire (AEQ) were developed 
and validated in a pilot study with fifty-six volunteer sub-
jects from the V.A. hospital domiciliary. The Human Sub-
jects Review Committee of the V.A. Medical Center raised a 
question as to the subjects' ability to manage the formats 
and the length of the proposed measures. In response, a 
pilot study was developed to assess the clarity of the 
instructions of the Future Health Inventory and to see which 
of two measures, the Subjective Probability Questionnaire 
(Lewinsohn et al., 1982) or the Alcohol Effects Question-
naire (Brown et al., 1980; Rohsenow, 1983), was more amena-
ble to a short form version. 
All subjects were males between the ages of 19 and 67, 
with a mean age of 44 and no history of significant psychi-
atric disorder. Seventy-seven percent of the sample had a 
history of treatment for alcohol abuse. The subjects repre-
sented the lower to middle range of socioeconomic status 
within the V.A. popu~ation, with an annual average income of 
less than 10,000 dollars and an average level of education 
of thirteen years. There were no significant differences 
between groups in term of age, race, marital status, educa-
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tion, or degree of life change in the last year. The only 
significant difference between alcoholic and nonalcoholic 
subjects was that alcohol abuse was associated with unem-
ployment (Q<.01). The fifty-six subjects in the pilot study 
received these three measures along with the demographic 
questionnaire, and 66% completed the forms again after a two 
week interval. 
The pilot subjects showed no difficulty with the for-
mat or instructions of the FHI. There were no questions 
asked during the administration of the measure and a very 
low incidence of incomplete data, i.e. 6%. All item means 
were negative, indicating consistent expectations of less-
than-average personal health risk. Alcoholic subjects 
endorsed higher rates of experience with suicide attempts, 
ulcers, migraine headaches, and being overweight, but sur-
prisingly the group means of different items were not par-
ticularly affected by actual experience with the health 
problem. Subjects' appraisals of personal risk were closer 
to their views of risk for their peers at the time of 
retesting, with an average test-retest correlation for com-
bined samples of ~=.58 (range .41 to .73). These data sug-
gested that the FHI was a feasible instrument for use in 
this study. 
Both Lewinsohn et al.'s (1982) Subjective Probability 
Questionnaire (SPQ) and Rohsenow's (1983) Alcohol Effects 
Questionnaire (AEQ) were considered as measures of differen-
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tial expectations for oneself and for others. Adequate val-
idity and reliabilty coefficients have previously been 
reported for both measures (Lewinsohn et al., 1982; Rohse-
now, 1983; Rohsenow & Bacharowski, 1984). However, each was 
validated on different populations-- depressed community 
volunteers and alcohol abusers, respectively. The SPQ con-
sists of eight scales of ten items each, representing the 
positive and negative dichotomies of self and world, and 
present and future. Subjects are asked to assign a proba-
bility rating, in intervals of ten, for the truth or like-
lihood of each statement, e.g. the likelihood (in %) of the 
statement "I am destined to suffer'' being true. Reported 
mean scale correlations range from .59 to .70 after a two 
month interval (Munoz & Lewinsohn, unpublished manuscript). 
The AEQ measures beliefs about alcohol's effects: 
forty self-referent and forty other-referent statements are 
rated by subjects as true or false based on their own exper-
ience. The items load onto eight expectancy scales, for 
which Rohsenow (1983) reports internal consistency ratings 
(using Cronbach's alpha) ranging from .49 to .74. Six of 
the subscales relate to expectations of positive consequen-
ces of drinking; two subscales measure expectations of nega-
tive consequences. The AEQ showed some advantage over the 
SPQ in its simpler format and its focus on expectations of 
reinforcement from alcohol. However, its length was similar 
to that of the SPQ. Thus the responses of the subjects in 
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the pilot study were examined in terms of their item-scale 
correlations, to see if the number of items could be reduced 
while maintaining comparable reliability and validity. 
The results of the pilot study showed support for the 
use of the AEQ, rather than the SPQ, for the proposed study. 
The original subscales of each measure were examined for 
alcoholic(~= 43), nonalcoholic(~= 13), and combined groups 
(~= 56). An a priori decision was made to keep a minimum of 
four items per scale, in order to assure a sufficient degree 
of variability in scale scores to discriminate among the 
subject groups. Several analyses were employed to compare 
the psychometric properties of the AEQ and the SPQ and to 
construct shortened revisions of each measure. 
First, item-whole correlations were computed and 
examined for each subscale. Item analyses indicated that 
there were more poorer items on the SPQ than the AEQ, i.e. 
item-scale correlations ranged from ~= .20 to .86 for the 
former, versus a range of ~= .38 to .86 for the latter. 
Items with the lowest item-whole correlations were elim-
inated, and the correlations were re-computed to see how the 
elimination of items affected the internal consistency of 
the subscale. On this basis, four items were dropped from 
the original AEQ subscales and four from the SPQ subscales 
while maintaining comparable or stronger item-scale corre-
lations. Because the AEQ consists of two alternate forms of 
the same forty items, differing only in self-other refer-
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ence, there was a more substantial reduction of overall 
items from 80 to 72. Also, the subjects showed substan-
tially more difficulty with the format of the SPQ and ieft 
more incomplete answers on that measure. Thus the results 
of the analyses, plus the considerations of content rele-
vancy, format, and length, supported the use of the revised 
AEQ rather than the SPQ. 
Two additional analyses were run on the AEQ pilot data 
to determine whether any further reduction in the number of 
items was possible. Simultaneous multiple correlations were 
used to examine the unique contribution of each item to the 
variance in the scale score. Part-whole correlations were 
also run to calculate the correlation between each item and 
a modified scale score computed without the variance of that 
particular item. With so few items in each scale, the part-
whole analyses were employed to identify spurious correla-
tions, in which items are significantly correlated to the 
total scale score but are unrelated to the other items in 
the scale (Cohen & Cohen, 1975). 
On the bases of these analyses, one more item was 
dropped, reducing the total number of items in the AEQ to 
70: internal consistency reliability coefficients for the 
eight subscales range from~= .38 to .86 (tl= .69). Average 
test-retest correlations for the "self" and "other" forms of 
the AEQ are, respectively, K= .73 (range of .58 to .83) and 
K= .64 (range of .41 to .73). Intercorrelations for the 
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eight subscales range from -.16 to .54 for the ''self" ver-
sion and from -.20 to .54 for the ''other" version of the 
measure, Tables 6-10 summarize the data from these analyses. 
A problem was noted with the Power subscale, in that 
it showed relatively weaker internal consistency and test-
retest reliability coefficients than did the other scales, a 
finding also reported by Brown et al. (1981) and Brown, 
Goldman, and Christianson (1985). However, Rohsenow (1983) 
reported satisfactory internal consistency for the scale, 
and it has shown some discriminant validity for heavier 
drinking patterns (Rohsenow, 1983; Rohsenow & Bachorowski, 
1984; Brown, 1985b). These findings suggest enough evidence 
of the scale's value to retain it for the purposes of the 
present study. 
TABLE 6: Average Item-Whole Correlations 
of the Original and Revised AEQ Subscales 
Original Revised 
Global-Self .69 .74 
Global-Other .63 .69 
Power-Self .61 .69 
Power-Other .53 .63 
Social-Self .65 .72 
Social-Other .60 .70 
Relax-Self .63 .63 
Relax-Other .64 .65 
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TABLE 7: AEQ-Self Interscale Correlations 
Care- Impair- Pleasure Global Power Social Sexual Relax 
less ment Positive 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
2 .50 
3 .01 -.08 
4 .09 -.16 .54 
5 .46 .17 .12 .32 
6 .16 .oo .41 .45 .38 
7 -.01 -.03 .56 .54 .20 .44 
8 .25 .13 .59 .47 .16 .54 .36 
164 
TABLE 8: AEQ-Other Interscale Correlations 
Care- Impair- Pleasure Global Power Social Sexual Relax 
less ment Positive 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
2 .54 
3 -.12 -.08 
4 .06 -.07 .40 
5 -.03 -.02 .06 .04 
6 -.04 -.13 .37 .51 -.10 
7 -.20 -.20 .47 .63 .12 .36 
8 .21 .22 .52 .39 -.10 .40 .30 
TABLE 9: Original and Revised AEQ 
Subscale Correlations 
Self Other 
Global Positive .96 .97 
Power .93 .75 
Social .96 .98 
Relaxation .96 .96 
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TABLE 10: Revised AEQ Subscale Test-Retest 
Reliability Coefficients 
Self Other 
Carelessness • 71 .90 
Global Positive .77 .68 
Impairment • 7 1 .84 
Pleasure .83 .79 
Power .58 .05 
Relaxation .73 .54 
Sexual .75 .70 




TEST OF SELF-OTHER DIFFERENCES 
A problem arose in testing the significance of the 
difference in self-other scores, and whether groups varied 
significantly in the degree of the self-other differences. 
A mixed design ANOVA testing within subjects (self-other) 
and between subjects (three groups) was not sufficient, 
because a simple comparison of unadjusted "self" and "other'' 
scores would have been impossible to interpret for several 
reasons. First of all, the variables of social desirabil-
ity, sensation seeking, and life stress were significantly 
confounded almost exclusively with the self-referent meas-
ures. Also, group means of these confounding variables 
varied significantly, so between group comparisons were 
problemmatic as well. One possible solution was to run 
another multiple regression correlation, partialling the 
effects of these three variables on a single difference 
score for each measure. While fairly straightforward con-
ceptually, this is not a recommended method of analysis for 
statistical reasons. The main argument against using a dif-
ference score in a multiple regression equation is that it 
overcorrects, because it assumes a high correlation between 
the two scales (Cohen & Cohen, 1975; Chronbach, 1970). 
Also, the reliability of difference scores is often low, as 
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it depends on the reliability of each measure as well as the 
strength of the measures' correlation (Cohen & Cohen, 1975). 
The preferred method of analysis, adopted for this 
study, was to partial the variance of the self-referent 
measure from the variance of the other-referent measure and 
then test the significance of their difference, both within 
and between subjects (Cohen & Cohen, 1975). That is, the 
"other" scores were treated as the dependent variable, 
tested in the second stage of the analysis after partialling 
for effects of social desirability, sensation seeking, life 
stress, and "self" scores. The coding for group membership 
was also included in the second stage, allowing a between-
groups test of the self-other differences. 
Because social desirability effects were associated 
with minimalization of personal vulnerability, unadjusted 
self-other difference scores would have been exaggerated, 
especially for the hypertension group, who had significantly 
higher social desirability scores. By using a partialling 
procedure, the test was more conservative, supporting the 
validity of the significant differences found for all of the 
AEQ self-other comparisons. Similarly, without partialling 
the effects of sensation seeking and life stress, spurious 
group differences in self-other evaluations might have 
resulted because the hypertension group significantly dif-
fered from the alcoholic groups on these two measures. When 
these were taken into account, there was only one signifi-
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cant group difference in degree of self-other discrepency, 
between the outpatient and hypertension groups for alcohol-
related impairment. 
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